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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and key questions
More than twenty years ago, public nance scholars started to focus on the phe-
nomenon of international capital mobility and its consequences for public goods
provision by national governments. The tax competition literature found consider-
able response in the political arena since it picked up some growing concern about
the increasing limitations of the national states scope for action. Since then, the
economy, tax policy and the scholarly thinking about these two have evolved. In
1986, when some of the seminal tax competition papers were published, the world-
wide net inows of foreign direct investment amounted to around 90 billion US
dollars and stocks reached a level of 940 billion dollars, whereas twenty years later,
in 2006, investment ows and stocks reached a record level of 1.3 trillion and 12
trillion dollars, respectively, see UNCTAD (2007).1 What was a newly perceived
phenomenon back then in 1986, is long an omnipresent issue in the public de-
bate. Meanwhile, public nance scholars have started to evaluate their theoretical
predictions. In short, some of them turned out to be correct, others failed. The
obvious mismatch of theories and empirical evidence in some cases triggered a
second wave of tax competition papers, which sets out to reconcile international
tax theory and the evidence. This book is part of this research program.
1Precisely, the investment ows reached their second highest level in history after the year
2000, while foreign held stocks were never higher than in 2006.
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The theory was correct in predicting decreasing statutory corporate tax rates
and a rising degree of multinational ownership structures. A race to the bottom,
i.e. zero corporate tax rates, did not occur, though. The theory does not t the
data with regard to tax payments on corporate prots which remained stable over
the last two decades. Furthermore, it cannot explain why governments broadened
the tax base although a narrowing would help a country to immunize itself against
international tax competition pressure. Finally, it may appear puzzling that even
high-tax countries keep attracting substantial amounts of inbound FDI.
In this book, we consider rm heterogeneity as a possible explanation for some
of these puzzles. A large part of the tax competition literature is (implicitly) based
on the concept of homogeneous rms, i.e. taxation a¤ects rms identically, or dif-
ferences in their exposure to taxation are not relevant for the model predictions. In
parallel to the International Economics branch, rm heterogeneity becomes more
important, and it will be shown in the following, that the introduction of cer-
tain di¤erences between rms requires considerable modications of the standard
theory and its predictions.
In the remainder of this rst introductory chapter, we will proceed as follows.
In the next subchapter, we will briey lay the conceptual foundations of the sub-
sequent chapters. Then, in subchapter 1.3, we will contextualize the di¤erent
chapters and summarize their main results.
1.2 Some conceptual foundations
1.2.1 Source-based taxation in small open economies
This book concentrates on a set of policy instruments which a¤ect income where
it is generated, i.e. at source. The standard issue with source-based taxation has
rstly been discussed in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986)2 and
can be described as follows. Small open economies are supposed to face a perfectly
elastic capital supply. This has the convenient implication for workers, or any other
residual claimant, that capital cannot earn any rent since all domestic capital can
2Note, though, that these two contributions build on the important work by Tiebout (1956)
and Oates (1972).
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be replaced by foreign capital. However, as it is known from the theory of tax
incidence, taxes on factors under perfect competition will be shifted forward by
increased prices and/or higher factor remuneration. In a simple setting with just
two production factors, labor and capital, this means that labor bears the whole
tax burden on capital - and even some additional burden. This excess burden of
source-based capital taxation results from the decreased stock of capital in the
small open economy which translates into lower wages. Therefore, Gordon (1986)
states that, even if alternative tax instruments, like wage taxes or residence-based
taxes on savings, are distortive, the optimal tax system for small open economies
implies zero source-based taxation of capital.
From a welfare point of view, there is no detrimental e¤ect of capital mobility on
welfare provided there are no restrictions on the use of available tax instruments
and no redistributive objectives. However, if the number of tax instruments is
limited or if source-based taxes on capital are used to redistribute from capital
income to labor, capital mobility (i.e. the transition from a closed economy to an
open economy) may have negative welfare e¤ects which have to be weighed against
the positive e¤ects from better resource allocation.
For purpose of illustration, assume that source-based capital taxes are the
only policy instrument available to attain either of the policy goals. In case of
redistributive aims, perfect mobility of capital simply means that redistribution is
not possible. The whole tax burden on capital is nally born by workers. In case of
public goods provision, capital mobility leads to an underprovision of public goods.
The benevolent government accounts for the e¢ ciency cost of capital taxation and
lowers the quantity of the publicly provided good until marginal benet equals
(the increased) marginal cost.
Both motivations for taxation, redistribution and public goods provision, imply
that uncoordinated policies lead to ine¢ cient outcomes. Welfare can be enhanced,
if the governments of the small countries agree on policy coordination and increase
the source-based (e¤ective) tax rates on capital.
Of course, there are qualications to this standard result of tax competition
and the large number of tax competition papers reect that their number is large.
This implies asymmetries between countries, see Bucovetsky (1991), the existence
of pure prots and the inability to fully tax them, see Zodrow and Mieszkowski
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(1986), the availability of more tax instruments, see Bucovetsky andWilson (1991),
foreign rm ownership, see Huizinga and Nielsen (1997), and so on.
A more general caveat is that the standard results are built on the assumption
that rms are all identical, at least from a tax perspective. As heterogeneity is in
the center focus of this book, it is worth discussing it in more detail.
1.2.2 Firm heterogeneity
Heterogeneity as a concept is hard to capture since whatever dimension is con-
sidered, heterogeneity is possible and plausible. From this point of view, this book
gives only examples of heterogeneity and illustrates the impact of introducing some
kind of heterogeneity into the standard model. Two exclusion restrictions apply:
Firstly, in order to be relevant, the heterogeneity in the aspect under considera-
tion has to be systematically linked to some other observable feature of the rm.
Secondly, the source of heterogeneity has to be tax relevant. In chapter 2, rm
heterogeneity with regard to mobility and protability is considered. Protability
is here equivalent to the size of the tax base. Chapter 3 introduces feedback e¤ects
of foreign investment on domestic protability and is based on the assumption that
rms or projects di¤er in the strength of feedback e¤ects. These feedback e¤ects
determine the location of the tax base. Chapter 4 analyzes MNEs with di¤erences
in their access to tax havens, i.e. there is heterogeneity in the opportunities to
manipulate the tax base. In chapters 5 and 6, heterogeneity in the exposure to
foreign tax rate changes due to complementarities within the multinational rm
is considered. Whereas in chapter 5, heterogeneity in ownership is considered, i.e.
a¢ liates are analyzed which di¤er in the country of their headquarters, in chapter
6, the di¤erence between multinational rms (MNE) and purely national rms
(PNE) is analyzed.
Being a multinational or not is one of the obvious sources of rm heterogeneity
and therefore deserves some more attention. From a public nance point of view,
MNEs and PNEs di¤er in the way they are taxed. MNE may have foreign income
which is subject to domestic repatriation taxes. If held by foreigners, MNE income
may be subject to withholding taxes. Moreover, it is generally assumed that
tax avoidance opportunities di¤er between MNEs and PNEs. MNEs may shift
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prots to low-tax jurisdictions or tax havens, they may have better access to credit
markets which has tax consequences, too, etc. Since multinational rms play such
a central role in this book, the next subchapter deals with this kind of rm in more
depth.
1.2.3 FDI and multinational rms
According to Markusen (2002), multinational enterprises are
rms that engage in foreign direct investment (FDI), dened as invest-
ments in which the rm acquires a substantial controlling interest in a
foreign rm or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign country. (p. 5)
Why are there multinational rms?3 As Gordon and Hines (2002) state, there
are three di¤erent lines along which the existence of MNEs may be explained.
Firstly, MNEs can be interpreted simply as vehicles for domestic households
to invest abroad. In this case, investment via MNEs and via an international
portfolio capital system organized by banks are a priori equivalent. Investors will
prefer investing abroad through multinationals rather than through the banking
system if the transaction costs of doing so are lower, if the relative tax treatment
is advantageous or if multinationals have a comparative advantage in placing the
most protable investments.
Secondly, MNEs serve as instruments to exploit international tax avoidance
opportunities. As the empirical literature shows, there is extensive prot-shifting
activities by multinationals, an observation which will be intensively discussed in
this book. Prot shifting may be achieved by transfer-pricing, the tax-induced
choice of interest and royalty rates used for transactions between related parties,
substitution between debt and equity nance, and careful consideration of where
to locate investments with expected supernormal prots.
3This question is necessarily related to the question why are there rms with which a large
literature deals. Starting with Coase (1937) who emphasizes that there is always the market as an
alternative to organization through the rm, this literature stresses the importance of transaction
costs, i.e. the costs involved using the markets, as well as problems of asymmetric information
which translate in free-rider problems and monitoring costs, see Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and
Holmstrom and Tirole (1989).
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Thirdly, MNEs own intangible capital in the form of unique technologies or
products, which they can protably exploit in foreign countries. In principle, this
could alternatively achieved by selling the right to use the technology or to sell
the products, but - as Gordon and Hines (2002) state - this is e¤ectively limited
by problems of asymmetric information.
One could add a fourth explanation which is related to complex production
structures. MNEs can disentangle the production chain in order to exploit in-
ternational di¤erences in location-specic cost structures. The MNE could locate
the skill-intensive parts of production in countries where this production factor is
relatively cheap and the labor-intensive part of production elsewhere. Seen from
this perspective, MNEs promote the international division of labor without losing
the advantages of internalization within a rm.
After having laid some conceptual foundations, we now turn to set out the
agenda for this book.
1.3 The agenda
In the following, we will briey summarize the content of the following ve chapters
and sketch the methods used as well as the main results. Chapter 7 will briey
draw conclusions.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Mobility and protability
Standard tax theory says that, in the presence of pure prots, corporate taxes do
not need to be zero, but the marginal investment project should not be taxed. The
analysis starts with a reconsideration of this benchmark result which is confronted
with the empirical fact that depreciation allowances in developed countries are in-
creasingly restricted which c.p. increases the taxation of the marginal investment.
This trend is commonly called tax rate cut cum base broadening. We build a model
with internationally mobile rms which di¤er in mobility and protability. It can
be shown that tax rate cut cum base broadening is an optimal tax policy if highly
mobile rms are more protable than the average rm in the economy. The reason
is that, due to a lack of discriminating instruments, the broadening of the tax base
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is used to distribute the tax burden from the highly mobile to the less mobile rms.
Thus, the introduction of heterogeneity with respect to mobility and protability
- and the assumption, that both are systematically linked -, changes the standard
result of tax theory.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Feedback e¤ects
This chapter departs from the theoretically derived expectation that taxes should
lower the quantity of investment. There is a number of papers providing evidence
that this is actually the case, but it seems nevertheless puzzling that high-tax
countries, like Germany, still receive substantial amounts of inbound FDI. The
general view on this observation is that other locational factors compensate the
tax disadvantage; in other words, high-tax countries receive investment despite of
high taxes. The main argument of this chapter implies that this could be true
because of high taxes. It is based on a model in which foreign investment has
some kind of feedback e¤ect on domestic activities or prots. If foreign investment
a¤ects domestic prots, domestic taxes become a determinant of foreign invest-
ment. If domestic prots are increased, domestic taxes deter foreign investment,
and if domestic prots are reduced (e.g. by cost increases), domestic taxes make
investment abroad more attractive. In the model, we assume that rms can replace
projects with certain feedback e¤ects by others. Then, taxes a¤ect the quality, not
just the quantity of investment. Put simply, high-tax countries attract projects
with small prots generated in their jurisdiction whereas low-tax countries receive
highly protable investment. This result has considerable consequences for the
thinking about welfare e¤ects of taxes. Firstly, the introduction of the quality
notion implies that not all types of investment are equally welcome. Secondly, if
taxes distort the quality of investment not only the quantity, the excess burden of
taxation may be mismeasured by empirical studies, and our results imply that it
is underestimated.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Heterogeneous prot-shifting
If tax rates cannot be changed due to political constraints, e.g. if the jurisdiction
is part of a union with harmonized tax rates, tax enforcement can be used as
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a strategic instrument to attract mobile capital or rms. In such a setting, tax
enforcement will be too low, as a benchmark result in the theoretical literature
states. In this chapter, we build a model with heterogeneous multinational rms
which di¤er in their access to tax havens. The benchmark result of underenforce-
ment occurs if the multinational rm with tax haven access has a substantially
larger tax base than the other rm which is supposed to have no access to tax
havens. The main contribution of this chapter is to analyze the case in which
the opposite is true, i.e. the non-haven-related rm has a larger tax base. As
expected, the incentive to underenforce vanishes. Interestingly, under certain cir-
cumstances, governments even have the incentive to increase the enforcement level
beyond the e¢ cient threshold. The reason is that governments may want to deter
investment by the haven-related multinational when these projects are replaced
by non-haven-related projects. The enforcement level will be ine¢ ciently high
because an individual government does not take into account that enforcement in-
creases the detrimental investment activity by the haven-related rm in the other
country. Coordination of enforcement policies would then imply a reduction in
overall enforcement expenditures.
1.3.4 Chapter 5: Tax e¤ects on multinational rms
Public concerns with respect to increasing capital and rm mobility are based
on the (implicit) assumption that foreign investment is a substitute for domestic
investment. Chapter 5 starts from the observation reported in recent empirical
contributions that foreign investment does not reduce domestic investment within
a multinational rm, it rather increases it. If this is the case, then foreign and
domestic activity or investment are not substitutes but rather complements. This
may have important consequences for the thinking about international tax issues.
Using a large rm-level dataset, we nd that tax reforms in the headquarter coun-
tries a¤ect a¢ liates in the same way they are supposed to a¤ect the headquarter
activity. That means, increasing corporate tax rates reduce the capital stocks in
the foreign a¢ liates. This runs counter to the well-known externality due to prot-
shifting. We nd that complementarities compensate the positive externality due
to prot-shifting to about one third.
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1.3.5 Chapter 6: Multinationals and tax competition
The observation that domestic and foreign investment are complements rather
than substitutes within a multinational rm is obviously at odds with the nding
in aggregate data that foreign investment decreases domestic investment dollar
for dollar. If domestic investment increases in response to foreign investment,
some rm somewhere has to reduce investment if capital supply is not perfectly
elastic. To analyze this aspect, we build a model where headquarter and a¢ liate
production are complements. As has already been shown in the literature, comple-
mentarities c.p. may give rise to overtaxation. The contribution of this chapter is
to show that if the capital market equilibrium is endogenized, complementarities
never lead to overtaxation. But, the existence of multinational rms in which for-
eign and domestic capital stocks are complements mitigates the pressure from tax
competition. The higher the fraction of multinational rms in the model economy,
the higher are uncoordinated equilibrium tax rates.
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Mobility and protability
In this chapter, the implications of international rm mobility for optimal tax
policy is considered. A benchmark result from the literature suggests that invest-
ment should not be taxed at the margin. Introducing heterogeneity in mobility and
protability, it is shown that taxation or subsidization of the marginal investment
project may be an optimal tax policy response if the mobile rms protability dif-
fers from the average ones in the economy.1
2.1 Introduction
Standard optimal tax theory recommends that small open economies should not
impose source-based taxes on the normal return to capital if capital is interna-
tionally mobile, see Gordon (1986) and Sinn (1990). If capital is taxed at source,
investment is distorted and national welfare declines. The literature has therefore
proposed a whole class of investment-neutral tax systems in which (pure) prots
can be taxed without distorting the investment decision. The main characteristic
of these investment-neutral corporate tax systems is that tax payments are zero if
the project return merely equals the cost of capital. In technical terms, the present
value of depreciation allowances (PVDA) is equal to 100% of the purchase price
of the capital good.2
1This chapter is based on Becker and Fuest (2007a).
2Under residence based taxation of capital income, investment neutrality requires tax depre-
ciation to equal economic depreciation. We focus on source based tax systems as does a large
11
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In 1982, the unweighted average of the PVDA for an investment in plant and
machinery across a large number of OECD countries was 81%, the PVDA for indus-
trial buildings 48% (Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002)). With the exception of
Ireland, no country allowed for immediate depreciation or an equivalent in present
value terms, i.e. a PVDA of 100% . Since then, the opening of capital markets
and increasing economic integration among these countries should have increased
the cost of distorting investment. In sum, we should have expected countries to
reform their tax system lowering the taxation of the normal return, i.e. increasing
the PVDA.
But, empirical observations do not support the view that governments pursued
this kind of tax policy strategy. Twenty-one years later, in 2003, the unweighted
average of the PVDA has dropped to 75% for plant and machinery and to 33% for
industrial buildings. This means that, on average, countries seem to have taken
the opposite direction of what standard optimal tax theory suggests.
In this chapter, we present an argument which contributes to explaining this
empirically observable development as part of an optimal tax policy. In the pres-
ence of mobile rms, it may be optimal under certain circumstances to distort
investment when this allows to reduce statutory tax rates, i.e. to pursue a tax rate
cut cum base broadening strategy.
Using the Corporate Tax Data Base provided by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
(IFS) and described and analyzed in Devereux et al. (2002), gure 2-1 depicts
each change in the statutory tax rates and the PVDA of the OECD countries
enumerated in footnote 2 in the years 1982-2003. The x-axis measures changes of
the tax rate, the y-axis the variation in the tax base. Data points which are not
on the axes present a simultaneous change of the tax rate and the tax base. Thus,
we get four quadrants among which two are (potentially) revenue-neutral, because
the variation of one tax parameter is nancedby the variation of the other one.
In addition, as long as the tax system is on the increasing part of the La¤er curve,
tax reforms in quadrant II are clearly revenue-decreasing and those in quadrant
IV are revenue-increasing.
part of the literature on international taxation because residence based taxes are di¢ cult to
implement.
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Figure 2-1 - Tax reforms in di¤erent OECD countries 1982-2003
As the gure shows, most tax policy reforms consist of a variation of either the
tax rate or the tax base, i.e. the data points are located on the axes. Among the
tax reforms which changed the tax rate and the tax base at the same time, only
the Canadian tax reform of 1991 followed the pattern predicted by the standard
theory; however, it just reversed the reform of 1990 to the same extent and may
therefore be interpreted as a mere correction. The only country to implement
a revenue decreasing tax reform of both the tax rate and base is Portugal in
1988, whereas the United States (1992), Finland (1995), France (1996) and Ireland
(2002) implemented revenue increasing tax reforms (quadrant IV).
Most tax reforms which changed tax rate and base simultaneously were of the
tax rate cut cum base broadening kind. Among those are tax reforms in Great
Britain, Germany and Japan, and - probably known best - the US tax reform of
1986. It is striking that even the larger countries, which could be expected to
be relatively autonomous in their tax policy, pursued this kind of strategy. The
question of how this development can be explained arises. There are basically two
approaches to explain this trend.
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A rst approach is based on the idea of policy learning, which is extensively
discussed in the political science literature (see e.g. Steinmo (2003) and Swank
and Steinmo (2002)): Inspired by the fundamental reforms in Great Britain and
the US, policymakers around the world followed their example and adjusted their
tax system to the new model (e.g. see Whalley (1990) and Gordon (1992)). The
underlying assumption is that policymakers do not have an explicit model of the
economy in mind and no clear e¢ ciency goals, but they do observe other policy-
makers and try to copy their strategies when they observe successful ones.3 The
US tax reform of 1986 was considered to be a success in historic dimensions and
could have triggered similar reforms in other countries (see diagram 1).
The second approach explains tax rate cut cum base broadening policy as an
optimal response to a changing economic environment. Within this approach,
Devereux et al. (2002) identify two possible reasons: income shifting and the pres-
ence of highly protable multinational rms. Income shifting is analyzed by Hau-
er and Schjelderup (2000) who show that, if multinational rms earn supernormal
prots and if the shifting of these prots to low tax countries via transfer pricing
is possible, it is optimal to reduce tax rates and broaden tax bases, despite the
distortion of investment caused by this policy. Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) show
that a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy may be optimal in the presence of
income shifting through thin capitalization even if there are no pure prots. The
second argument is rst provided by Bond (2000) who proposes to interpret the tax
rate cut cum base broadening to be the optimal tax policy reaction to the existence
of mobile and highly protable rms. Without using a formal model, he suggests
a setting in which multinational companies are assumed to be very sensitive to
the e¤ective average tax rate whereas investment by immobile rms is relatively
insensitive to the e¤ective marginal tax rate. Bond concludes that a government
then might increase domestic investment by lowering the statutory tax rate and
accepting a broader tax base, even though this results in a higher cost of capital.
In this chapter, we contribute to the second approach to explaining the trend
3Another aspect here is that the US was an important supplier of foreign direct investment
at the time. The foreign tax credit system enables the host country to increase tax rates on US
multinationals up to the US statutory rate without increasing the e¤ective tax rate for these
rms. When the US lowered the tax rates fundamentally, other countries were forced to do the
same if they did not want to push the US rms out of the country (Slemrod (2004a)).
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towards low tax rates and broad tax bases. Surprisingly, the literature on optimal
corporate tax policy in the presence of internationally mobile rms is very small.
Of course, rm mobility as such has been extensively analyzed in the literature on
foreign direct investment (Lipsey (2001)) and the new economic geography (see
Ottaviano and Thisse (2003) for a survey). There are also several contributions
analyzing intergovernmental competition in corporate tax rates4 with rmmobility
(Richter and Wellisch (1996), Boadway, Cu¤ and Marceau (2002), Fuest (2005)).
But, to the best of our knowledge, the only contribution which analyzes the optimal
structure of the corporate tax system in the presence of rm mobility in a formal
model is Osmundsen, Hagen and Schjelderup (1998). These authors consider a
model where rms di¤er in mobility costs and tax policy is constrained by problems
of asymmetric information. Their results and the relation to our analysis will be
dicussed further in subchapter 2.4.
We analyze the optimal tax policy in the presence of mobile rms in a frame-
work where rms di¤er in protability and mobility costs. The government may
use the tax base and the tax rate as policy parameters. In contrast to Osmundsen
et al. (1998), the government cannot use nonlinear taxes to implement a separ-
ating equilibrium where rms reveal their type. Instead, a linear tax system is
considered, which gives rise to a pooling equilibrium. We show that the mobility
of rms across borders does create incentives for governments to deviate system-
atically from investment neutrality. The optimal policy depends on how protable
mobile rms are, relative to immobile rms. Essentially, changing the combination
of tax rates and tax bases may be interpreted as a form of price discrimination.
If the marginal mobile rm is more protable than the average rm in the coun-
try, a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy is optimal. The reason is that this
policy redistributes the tax burden from mobile to immobile rms. Thus, mobile
rms can be prevented from leaving the country without sacricing too much tax
revenue. But if the marginal mobile rm is less protable than the average rm
in the economy, a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy reduces welfare. In this
case, the optimal tax policy consists of subsidizing the normal return to capital
and increasing the statutory tax rate.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In subchapter 2.2, we
4See Wilson and Wildasin (2004) for a survey of general tax competition issues.
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present our argument in the framework of a stylized model. Subchapter 2.3 dis-
cusses some extensions. In 2.4 we discuss how our results relate to the ndings in
the literature and conclude.
2.2 The model
In this subchapter, we present the model and the main argument of this chapter.
Firstly, we discuss the meaning of and the relationship between mobility and prof-
itability (2.2.1), then we outline the precise setting of the model (2.2.2). In 2.2.3
the optimal tax policy in the presence of mobile rms is derived.
2.2.1 Mobility and protability
Consider an economy with a large number of heterogeneous prot-maximizing
rms. These rms di¤er in two characteristics, protability and mobility. Prot-
ability is dened as the average return per unit of capital input. Mobility means
the opportunity to relocate to the foreign country. Whereas it is easy to understand
the di¤erence between more and less protable rms, it is necessary to discuss the
meaning of higher and lower mobility in greater detail.
Mobile rms are those for which a change of location has a relatively low cost.
With  and  denoting the after tax prots at home and abroad, respectively, a
relevant indicator of mobility could be the di¤erence  . Firms with a high dif-
ference between these two prot indicators will be called immobile. This is true in
both directions, i.e. rms which have a much higher prot when producing abroad
are not mobile either. In contrast, rms where the di¤erence     approaches
zero are those which may react to policy measures like tax reforms by changing
their location. Those will be called mobile.
For the purpose of our argument, it is helpful to introduce the parameter A
which is an indicator of the prot di¤erence   . Each rm is characterized by
an individual value of A dened by
@ (   )
@A
< 0 (2.1)
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For simplicity, we assume that A is uniformly distributed over the interval
fA ; A+g.5 It is crucial to understand that this does neither imply that A also
correlates with prot itself ( @
@A
7 0) nor that A is necessarily correlated with prof-
itability (@(=K)
@A
7 0). Figure 2-2 gives an example which illustrates how mobility
and protability could be linked. With A on the x-axis, the prot-di¤erence de-
creases continuously, which is given by denition of A. If any kind of policy is
supposed to have an impact on the location decision of rms, there have to be
rms which are indi¤erent between producing at home or abroad. Let Ah denote
the protability parameter of this marginal rm:

 
Ah

= 
 
Ah

(2.2)
The protability of the rms in the economy can be positively or negatively
correlated with A or not at all. In the gure, mobile rms, i.e. those located
around Ah (the intersection of     = 0), have a higher profability than rms
which are less mobile, which is illustrated by the regression line. As will become
clear later on, the protability di¤erence between these two, mobile and immobile
rms, is crucial for our argument.
Immobile rms can be interpreted as companies which largely benet from
location specic advantages, e.g. coal mining companies. In contrast, mobile rms
with intermediate values of A are those which have large rm-specic advantages
which are not lost when the location is changed.
A possible point of criticism is that we consider the rms location decision as an
all-or-nothing decision, i.e. the locations are mutually exclusive. Empirically, we
rather observe multinational corporations with a¢ liates in more than one country.
For the motivation of our approach, it is helpful to imagine an existing plant or
production unit which can be relocated abroad. In the context of our model we
call this plant or production unit rm.
5The simplest example is  = P and  = P    1A , where prots P and P  are assumed to
depend on location. In this case, A can be interpreted as the inverse of the moving cost. Another
very simple example is  = AP and  = AP  G, where prots P are assumed to be equal in
all locations and G is some constant cost of relocation. The higher the A, the less important is
the relocation cost G. Our model takes a more general form of prot function which comprises
these examples as special cases, as is shown in the next subsection.
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Mobile firms Immobile firmsImmobile firms
Difference in profits
(pi – pi*)
A
Profitability of
individual firms
(pi/K)
0
0
Ah
Difference in profits Profitability
Figure 2-2 - Correlation between mobility and protability
2.2.2 Firms
All rms are owned by domestic residents. Foreign rm ownership is discussed in
the extensions in subchapter 2.3. Firms invest in capital K. Capital is provided
by a world capital market at a given nontax cost of capital which is normalized to
unity. Firms receive an income F i (Ki; Ai). The production technology F i di¤ers
across rms, which generates di¤erent levels of protability, and is well-behaved
(F iKK < 0 < F
i
K and F
i
A > 0). In the following, we will suppress the rm-specic
indices i for a better reading. After-tax prots are:
 = (1  u)F (A;K)  (1  u)K (2.3)
where u is the statutory tax rate and  the rate of tax depreciation allowances.
Here, we abstract from international prot-shifting e.g. by transfer pricing or
internal debt, which will be analyzed in the extensions, subchapter 2.3.
Each rm faces a sequence of two decisions. At the rst stage, the location
decision is made, i.e. the rm chooses to locate either at home or abroad. At the
second stage, the rm determines the optimal capital input.
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Starting with the second stage, the optimal capital input is given by
@F (A)
@K
=
1  u
1  u (2.4)
if the rm produces at home. Note that the functional form of F determines
whether or not the rms optimal capital stock K depends on A. If the rm
produces abroad, its optimal investment is given by @F
(A)
@K = c
, where c is the
foreign capital cost.
Consider next the location decision at the rst stage. The rm chooses the
location where after tax prots are higher. The rm stays in the home country if
and only if
(1  u)F (K;A)  (1  u)K   (A) (2.5)
It is assumed that the total number of rms is xed in this model, i.e. we do
not consider market exit of rms due to taxation. As is shown in the appendix,
introducing market exit of rms in our model does not change any of our results.
2.2.3 Optimal tax policy with mobile rms
It is the purpose of this chapter to derive the optimal corporate tax policy of a
small open economy6 in the presence of mobile rms. We therefore assume that
the government is benevolent and maximizes the welfare of its households, given
the xed public revenue constraint T which is given by
T =
Z Ah
A 
u (F   K) dA (2.6)
In the following, we consider variations in u and  (e.g. a tax rate cut cum base
broadening strategy) under the condition that T remains constant. This is given
by:
dT = Tudu+ Td = 0 , du
d
=
T
Tu
(2.7)
First, consider the e¤ect of a revenue-neutral variation on the prot of the
6Our assumption of a small open economy implies that we abstract from issues of strategic
interaction between tax policies of di¤erent countries.
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marginal rm (with mobility parameter Ah): Prots change by
dh =    F h  Ah; Kh  Kh du+ uKhd (2.8)
Starting from a situation in which investment is not distorted, i.e.  = 1, and
using (2.7), it can easily be shown that an increase of  has the following e¤ect on
 (see appendix):
dh
d
= 
p

  h (2.9)
where 
p = uK
h
Tu
R Ah
A  KdA > 0 is some scale parameter,  =
RAh
A  [F K]dARAh
A  KdA
and
h = F
h Kh
Kh
.  is the aggregate pre-tax prot generated in the domestic country
divided by the aggregate capital stock. Thus,  can be interpreted as the average
protability of rms located in the domestic country, where as h is the protabilty
of the marginal rm. It follows from (2.9) that the marginal rm gains from a tax
rate cut cum base broadening strategy (d < 0) if it is more protable than the
average of the whole economy. However, the fact that the marginal rm is better
o¤ with tax rate cut cum base broadening does not necessarily mean that such
a reform is desirable from a social point of view. In the following, we therefore
consider social welfare which we dene as national income minus taxes (remember:
there is a xed tax revenue requirement).
Social welfare is given by
W =
Z Ah
A 
[(1  u)F   (1  u)K] dA+
Z A+
Ah
dA (2.10)
A variation in the tax rate u and the tax base  has the following e¤ect on
social welfare:
dW =
"Z Ah
A 
  [F   K] dA
#
du+
"Z Ah
A 
uKdA
#
d (2.11)
At the margin, a relocation of the Ah-rm has no impact on welfare because
it is indi¤erent between producing at home or abroad. It has some e¤ect on tax
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revenue, though (see appendix).7
Again, we consider a tax revenue-neutral tax reform. This means that u and 
are changed according to (2.7). Starting from non-distortion of investment ( = 1),
it follows (after some rearrangements presented in the appendix):
dW
d
= 
s

  h (2.12)
where 
s =   u2
Tu
@Ah
@u
Kh
R Ah
A  KdA > 0 and ,
h as dened above. The welfare
e¤ect of varying ; evaluated at  = 1, depends on whether the term in square
brackets is positive or negative. To get the intuition, interpret the rst term in the
square brackets as the average return per unit of capital in the overall economy and
the second term as the return per capital unit of the marginal rm. The ndings
derived in (2.12) can be summarized by
Proposition 1 Optimal tax policy in the presence of mobile rms depends on
the protability of the mobile rms relative to the rest of the economy. Precisely,
optimal strategies are:
Non-distortion of investment is optimal when mobility and protability are
not correlated:   h = 0 (dW
d
= 0 at  = 1).
Tax rate cut cum base broadening is optimal when mobility and protability
are positively correlated:   h < 0. (dW
d
< 0 at  = 1)
Tax rate increase cum base narrowing is optimal when mobility and prof-
itability are negatively correlated:   h > 0. (dW
d
> 0 at  = 1)
Setting  = 1 is an optimal strategy only if the marginal rm is as protable
as the average in the economy. However, if one assumes that the mobile rm is
more protable than the rest of the economy8, as does Bond (2000), the term in
square brackets as well as the whole RHS of equation (2.12) becomes negative. A
7For the same reason, we can abstract from rms which are driven out of the market. A
marginal change in u or  has no e¤ect on W because the marginal rm is just indi¤erent
between producing and not producing. See also the appendix.
8In gure 2, the protability spots of the immobile rms on the left hand side of the mobile
rms area have to be lower on average than the spots of the mobile rms located around Ah.
Note that the rms on the right hand side which have already left the domestic country are not
part of the calculus.
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reduction in the tax allowance , i.e. a broadening of the tax base, leads to a rise
in welfare.
How can a distortion of investment lead to increasing welfare? By broadening
the tax base and lowering the tax rate the government redistributes tax liabilities
from the highly protable rm to the less protable rms. The reason is that
highly protable rms gain more from a tax rate cut than less protable ones.
The government can thus increase overall tax revenues without losing the mobile
rm, i.e. it implements a form of price discriminiation. This comes at the cost of
distorting the investment of all rms. But the welfare cost of introducing a small
investment distortion, departing from an equilibrium with undistorted investment,
is negligible. The optimal policy would equalize the marginal welfare loss resulting
from the investment distortion to the marginal gain resulting from raising more
tax revenue.
The opposite case is possible, too. Assume that the immobile rm is more
protable than the mobile rm. In this case, the government wants to redistribute
tax liabilities from the less protable rm to the more protable one. It can do
so by narrowing the tax base and increasing the tax rate, i.e. by subsidizing
the marginal investment. Such a tax system hits the protable and immobile
rms harder than the non-protable mobile ones. Essentially, deviations from
investment neutrality may thus be understood as a form of price discrimination in
a second best environment.9
2.3 Extensions
In this subchapter, we extend the model in two important dimensions. Firstly,
we consider how prot-shifting a¤ects our results (3.1) Secondly, we analyze the
implications of foreign rm ownership (3.2).
9Note that the introduction of a progressive corporate tax system would not solve the problem
since it is the di¤erence in protability which is decisive not the di¤erence in the absolute amounts
of prots.
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2.3.1 Prot-shifting
It is interesting to ask how our results are related to those derived by Hauer
and Schjelderup (2000), who focus on prot-shifting as an explanation for tax
rate cut cum base broadening policies. Therefore we extend the model by the
opportunity for rms to shift prots. Let E denote the part of the prot which
can be avoided and/or shifted to the foreign tax base. Let Ci (E) denote the
avoidance cost function for which we assume Ci (0) = 0 and CiE; C
i
EE > 0 which
ensures an interior solution. We assume that the avoidance cost is not deductible
from the tax base. From now on, we suppress the indices i as we did before. The
prot of the marginal rm is equal to
h = (1  u)F h   (1  u)Kh + uEh   Ch  Eh =  (2.13)
At the third stage of decision, the rm decides simultaneously on the optimal
capital input K; which is not a¤ected by the avoidance opportunity, and on the
optimal avoidance level. Optimal avoidance is given by
u = CE (2.14)
Again, a revenue-neutral tax reform is considered. Tax revenue is now reduced
by the shifted amount E:
T =
Z Ah
A 
[u (F   K   E)] dA (2.15)
Social welfare is given by
W =
Z Ah
A 
[(1  u)F   (1  u)K + uE   C (E)] dA+
Z A+
Ah
dA (2.16)
Evaluated at  = 1, an increase in  has the following e¤ect on social welfare
dW
d
= 
s
"R Ah
A  [F  K   E] dAR Ah
A  KdA
  F
h  Kh   Eh
Kh
#
  
E
"Z Ah
A 
[Eu] dA
#
(2.17)
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where 
s > 0, as dened above, and 
E = u
2
Tu
R Ah
A  KdA > 0 is some scale
parameter.
The impact of prot-shifting can be illustrated by assuming that we are in a
situation where the right hand side of eq. (2.12) is equal to zero, i.e. where, in the
absence of prot-shifting, marginal protability and average protability equalize.
Then, equation (2.17) boils down to
dW
d
= 
s
"
Eh
Kh
 
R Ah
A  EdAR Ah
A  KdA
#
  
E
"Z Ah
A 
[Eu] dA
#
(2.18)
Consider rstly the last term on the right hand side, which is the e¤ect derived
in similar form by Hauer and Schjelderup (2000). Assuming that the rst two
terms in square brackets on the right hand side are equal and sum up to zero,
prot-shifting creates the incentive to distort investment, since Eu > 0.
Now, consider the rst term on the right hand side. If the level of prot-
shifting of the marginal rm (measured as a fraction of the capital stock) is higher
than the average level, there is a countervailing e¤ect resulting from the mobility
of rms. In this case, a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy which makes
prot-shifting less attractive also redistributes the tax burden from immobile to
mobile rms. But in the presence of rm mobility, the government wants to do
the opposite. If this mobility e¤ect becomes very large, it might overcompensate
the Hauer-Schjelderup-e¤ect. Our ndings can be summarized as
Proposition 2 If prot-shifting is not correlated with mobility, the existence of
prot-shifting unambiguously generates incentives to pursue a tax rate cut cum
base broadening policy.
If the marginal rms avoidance level is (much) higher than the average avoid-
ance in the economy, the existence of prot-shifting may induce policy-makers to
pursue a tax rate increase cum base narrowing strategy.
2.3.2 Foreign rm ownership
In the presence of foreign rm ownership (¤o) the government may have the in-
centive to increase corporate taxes beyond the level which is optimal in the case
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of purely domestic rm ownership, see Huizinga and Nielsen (1997). The reason is
that corporate taxes can be used to redistribute income from foreign rm owners
to domestic households.10 However, the e¤ect of foreign rm ownership on the op-
timal combination of tax rates and tax bases is less clear. Hauer and Schjelderup
(2000) demonstrate that the introduction of ¤o aggravates the tendency towards
broadening the tax base and cutting tax rates. The same is true in a context where
corporate taxes serve as a backstop, as shown by Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005).
Assume that foreign rm ownership means that foreigners which are not part
of the domestic welfare function receive a fraction i of the private return of rm
i. Again, the indices i will be suppressed henceforth. Since there are only source-
based taxes in our model, tax revenue is not a¤ected by foreign rm ownership.
Social welfare is given by
W =
Z Ah
A 
(1  ) [(1  u)F   (1  u)K] dA+
Z A+
Ah
(1  )dA (2.19)
The marginal rm satises (1  ) (1  u)F h   (1  u)Kh = (1  )h,
which is equivalent to equation (2.5), i.e. foreign rm ownership c.p. does not
a¤ect location. A variation in the two tax parameters under consideration has the
following e¤ect on W :
dW =
"Z Ah
A 
  (1  ) [F   K] dA
#
du+
"Z Ah
A 
(1  )uKdA
#
d (2.20)
The xed revenue constraint requires that u and  are changed according to
(2.7). It follows:
dW
d
= 


   h (2.21)
where 
 =  u
2 @Ah
@u
Kh
Tu
R Ah
A  (1  )KdA > 0 and  =
RAh
A  (1 )[F K]dARAh
A  (1 )KdA
.
How can (2.21) be interpreted? If the fraction of foreign rm ownership is equal
for all rms in the economy, i = , it follows that  = , as dened in (2.12).
In this case, ¤o does not alter the results derived in subchapter 2.2 in qualitative
10Note that this argument requires a di¤erent model framework than ours, which is based on
the assumption of a xed revenue constraint.
26 CHAPTER 2. MOBILITY AND PROFITABILITY
terms.
The image changes if ¤o correlates with protability. If this correlation is
positive (negative),  <  ( > ), and the optimal tax policy is taxation (sub-
sidization) of investment, starting from a situation in which  = h. The reason
is that the existence of ¤o changes the redistributive e¤ects of a revenue-neutral
tax reform from the national perspective. If ¤o is positively correlated with prof-
itability, this has the same e¤ect as if immobile rms were less protable (because
a larger part of the protable rmsincome is captured by foreigners). Therefore,
the government will implement a tax policy which redistributes the tax burden
from the mobile to the immobile rms by broadening the tax base and cutting tax
rates. The ndings resulting from (2.21) can be summarized in
Proposition 3 Assume that  = h, i.e. without foreign rm ownership (¤o),
optimal tax policy is not to distort investment. Introducing foreign rm ownership
has the following e¤ect on optimal tax policy:
If ¤o is perfectly uncorrelated to protability,  = , foreign rm ownership
has no impact on optimal tax policy.
If ¤o is positively (negatively) correlated with protability,  <  ( > ),
foreign rm ownership makes the tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy (tax
rate increase cum base narrowing) an optimal policy.
2.4 Discussion and concluding remarks
The analysis in the preceding subchapter has shown that, under simple assump-
tions on rm mobility, the e¢ ciency property of a tax system which is neutral for
investment vanishes. Depending on the relative protability of di¤erent groups of
rms, the optimal tax policy implies a tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy
which gives rise to a positive tax rate on the marginal investment, or the opposite.
In other words, the introduction of heterogeneity puts the standard result into
question. Depending on how these two sources of heterogeneity are correlated,
the optimal tax policy deviates from the standard recommendation in the one or
the other direction. In addition, the optimal policy depends on the correlation of
prot-shifting opportunities and foreign rm ownership with mobility. How do our
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results relate to the ndings of the existing literature?
Our model can be understood as part of the literature that explains distortion-
ary elements in existing tax systems by the lack of appropriate tax instruments.11
In the presence of internationally mobile rms the government would like to dis-
criminate between mobile and immobile rms. Our model directly shows that the
government would set the rm specic tax rate so that each rm would receive its
reservation prot (i.e. the prot it could earn abroad). There would be no reason
to distort investment. However, in this chapter we assumed that the government
faces informational or political constraints and has no means to do so directly.
Given this, the tax base is used as an instrument for price discrimination.
Of course, the basic idea that economic distortions are caused by a lack of tax
instruments is not without problems. If there are informational constraints, in
contrast, one could argue that the government might implement instruments to
separate tax-payers according to the unobservable characteristic. This is the case
in the model presented by Osmundsen et al. (1998). Here, the government cannot
observe rm specic mobility. Therefore, if the government announces high taxes
on immobile rms and low taxes on mobile rms, the immobile rms will mimick
the mobile rms. However, the government can exploit the fact that rms with
high location specic rents and low mobility want to invest more than rms with
low location specic rents and high mobility. Therefore, the optimal tax policy
will induce the mobile rms to invest less than in the rst best. This reduces
the incentives of immobile rms to mimick the mobile ones. One way of doing so
would be to cut depreciation allowances for the mobile rms.
While in Osmundsen et al. (1998) the distortion of investment is used as a
device to separate mobile from immobile rms, we show that the distortion of
investment is equally optimal in a pooling equilibrium if mobile rms are more
protable than the average rm. In our model, the distortion of investment is used
as a redistribution device between mobile rms and immobile ones. Our model
thus relies on a fundamentally di¤erent mechanism than the one by Osmundsen
et al. (1998).
11Other examples of this literature are the paper by Hauer and Schjelderup (2000) and Fuest
and Hemmelgarn (2005), as discussed in the introductory section. Hong and Smart (2007) show
that tax havens can be e¢ ciency enhancing because they allow mobile rms to lower their e¤ective
tax rate without leaving the country in which they produce.
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The optimality of the tax rate cut cum base broadening strategy crucially
depends on the relative protability of mobile rms compared to immobile rms.
In a recent contribution, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) develop a model where
heterogeneous rms invest abroad if the gain from avoiding trade costs outweighs
the cost of maintaing multiple production plants (proximity-concentration trade-
o¤). In their model, only the most productive rms in the export sector decide
to invest abroad. They also nd empirical support for their results. Devereux
et al. (2002) provide evidence for a positive correlation between protability and
the probability of producing in more than one country. Further evidence can be
found in Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). In terms of our model, this would
suggest that the optimal tax policy predicted by our model would be consistent
with the empirically observed policy.
Finally, one important assumption made in our analysis is the absence of res-
idence based taxes. In a purely residence based system of capital income taxation,
the domestic government would be able to tax rms owned by domestic residents
irrespective of where they produce. The problem of rm mobility and tax compet-
ition would vanish. Existing tax systems, though, are a mixture of the source and
the residence principle. Most taxes levied at the rm level are e¤ectively source
based taxes12 whereas taxes levied at the household level are residence based. The
interaction between these taxes depends very much on assumptions on the prevail-
ing system of dividend taxation and the identity of the marginal shareholder. If the
marginal shareholder is an international investor, the results of the analysis in this
chapter continue to hold even in the presence of residence based taxation. If the
marginal shareholder is a domestic resident, investment neutrality requires that
tax depreciation equals economic depreciation, see Sinn (1990). The benchmark
tax policy will thus be di¤erent but optimal deviations from investment neutrality
are likely to be driven by the same forces as in our model. This is a point to be
investigated in future research.
To conclude, the analysis in this chapter departs from the observation that the
tax rate cut cum base broadening reforms implemented by many countries are hard
to reconcile with the traditional result from optimal tax theory that the e¤ective
12Note that, at the corporate level, most industrialised countries either exempt foreign prots
of domestic rms from domestic taxation or defer domestic taxation until repatriation.
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tax rate on the marginal investment should be equal to zero. The analysis has
shown that rm mobility may be a reason to deviate from investment neutrality.
The direction of the deviation, though, is ambiguous. Our analysis conrms the
proposition made by Bond (2000) that a tax rate cut cum base broadening policy
may be optimal if mobile rms are highly protable. However, if mobile rms
are less protable than the average in the economy, a tax rate increase cum base
narrowing policy might be optimal, too. This could be true in the presence of high
location-specic rents.
Thus, our model provides an economic rationale for the observed tax policy,
which acts as a complementary explanation next to prot-shifting and policy-
learning. Interestingly, the plausible assumption that more mobile rms have easier
access to prot-shifting implies that tax rate cut cum base broadening policies
become less attractive in our model. For empirical research, our analysis primarily
raises the question of whether more protable rms are more or less sensitive to
tax di¤erences across countries than less protable rms.
2.5 Appendix
This appendix derives equations (2.9) and (2.12) in the text. Before we do so, it is
helpful to clarify why the introduction of market exit of rms does not change our
results. A marginal variation in the tax parameters changes the number of rms
if there is at least one rm which is indi¤erent between producing and leaving the
market. This rm has an after-tax prot of zero (1  u)F (K;A) (1  u)K = 0.
Since our analysis concentrates on the case in which  = 1, the after-tax prot
can be expressed as (1  u) (F (K;A) K) = 0. With u < 1, this implies that
the net prot is zero, as well as tax payments. That means that the marginal rm
does not contribute neither to social welfare nor to tax revenue. Therefore, the
rms decision whether to leave or to stay in the market is irrelevant to optimal
tax policy, and the government can simply ignore it.
The derivatives of (2.6) with respect to  and u , evaluated at  = 1, are given
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which can be simplied to equation (2.9) in the text.
Equivalently, we can rewrite equation (2.11) as
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where we have used @A
h
@
=  @Ah
@u
uKh
Fh Kh and  = 1. This equation can be
simplied to equation (2.12) in the text.
Chapter 3
Feedback e¤ects
This chapter introduces feedback e¤ects of foreign investment on domestic prots.
It is shown that, if foreign investment causes domestic prots to change, corporate
taxes distort the quality, not just the quantity of cross-border investment. The
most important implication of this result is that the distortions due to corporate
taxation may be much larger than usually measured by empirical studies focussing
on investment quantities. We provide empirical evidence that high-tax countries
receive inbound investment which contribute less to tax revenue than does inbound
investment in low-tax countries.1
3.1 Introduction
Standard models of tax e¤ects on international investment assume that investing
abroad has no direct impact on the protability of domestic activities of the invest-
ing rm.2 However, there is extensive empirical evidence that investing abroad, be
it greeneld investment or mergers and acquisition (m&a), strongly inuences the
protability, productivity, employment etc. of the investor rm. In this chapter,
we present a simple model which allows for such feedback e¤ects of foreign direct
investment on domestic activity. We nd that, in the presence of heterogeneity in
feedback e¤ects, corporate taxes distort the quality, not just the quantity, of for-
1This chapter is based on Becker and Fuest (2007b).
2See the surveys in Hauer (2001), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), Fuest, Huber and Mintz
(2005) and Devereux (2007).
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eign direct investment. High tax countries are likely to attract investment projects
which yield low prots in the host country and contribute little to its corporate
tax revenue whereas low tax countries can expect the opposite. We call this the
composition e¤ect of corporate taxation on foreign direct investment.
We provide empirical evidence supporting the main prediction of our model
with regard to tax revenues. We nd that the contribution of foreign direct invest-
ment to tax revenue is positive for low tax countries but declines with increasing
tax rates. If the e¤ective average tax rate exceeds approximately 30 per cent, an
increase in foreign direct investment reduces corporate tax revenue.
In the literature, the observation that protability tends to be lower in high tax
countries is usually interpreted as reecting that rms shift book prots to low tax
countries.3 This chapter o¤ers a complementary explanation for tax driven di¤er-
ences in protability. Our analysis suggests that existing studies may overestimate
the importance of prot-shifting. This may have important policy implications.
We discuss this issue further in subchapter 3.5.
In research on international taxation, feedback e¤ects of foreign investment
on the investor rm have been neglected completely. In contrast, the literature
on multinational rms recognizes their importance and points out that synergies
between di¤erent rms of a multinational group and complementarities of their
assets are an important factor for the formation and the existence of these rms.4
We dene synergies as an increase in prots for the whole group caused by border-
crossing investment. A multinational group will realize an investment project if
the after tax prot change for the whole group is at least as high as the cost of
capital. The rm is indi¤erent about where these prots are generated, in the
headquarter or in the new production plant. But, from a national tax policy
perspective, the distribution of prots across subsidiaries of the multinational rm
located in di¤erent countries is of key importance. It is the purpose of this chapter
to analyze the e¤ect of taxes on cross-border investment when the prot change is
not restricted to occur in the country of the initial investment.
In principle, there are three possible ways in which a foreign investment project
may change the distribution of prots within the multinational group. Firstly,
3See e.g. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994) and the studies cited in section 5.
4See e.g. the introduction to the theory of multinational rms in Markusen (2002), ch. 1.
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the investment may not a¤ect the prot generated by the parent company in
its country of residence, as usually assumed in standard models of international
investment. In this case, the marginal investment project has a return equal to
the cost of capital. Secondly, the transaction may reduce the prots of the parent
company. This may happen, for instance, if a plant built abroad produces a good
which competes with a good produced by the parent company. In this case, the
project will only be undertaken if it increases the protability of the subsidiary
by more than the cost of capital. Thirdly, the investment project may increase
the prots of the parent company. A possible reason could be that the subsidiary
provides market access or specic know how to the parent company. In this case,
the marginal investment project may imply that prots in the subsidiary are very
low or even negative because the higher prots of the parent company make the
investment worthwhile.
Recent evidence shows that investment abroad has a signicant impact on all
types of performance indicators of the parent company, independent of whether
investment takes the form of greeneld projects or m&a. Desai, Foley and Hines
(2005a) nd that investment abroad increases the aggregate domestic investment
activity by US multinationals. Desai, Foley and Hines (2005b) use rm-level data
of US multinationals and show that foreign investment in plant, property and
equipment (PPE) is associated with higher domestic PPE investment. Similarly,
Egger and Pfa¤ermayer (2003) nd that foreign investment increases domestic
investment in tangible assets and does not decrease investment in intangibles.
Castellani and Barba Navaretti (2004) and Jaeckle (2006) show that going abroad
increases domestic productivity and competitiveness. In addition, there are several
empirical studies, surveyed by Andrade, Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2001), analyzing
the e¤ects of m&a on the investor rms performance. There is empirical evidence
that m&a create e¢ ciency gains which seem to be distributed asymmetrically,
though, as e.g. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) report. While recently acquired
rms experience productivity improvements, the investor rms plants su¤er pro-
ductivity losses, making the net change for the investor rm essentially zero.
Our main argument is the following. If investment abroad has some e¤ect on the
performance of the investor company in the domestic country, then the marginal
return generated in the foreign location may di¤er from the cost of capital. For
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example, if domestic prots increase, then the marginal foreign investment may
even yield negative returns. Given this, taxes a¤ect the selection of border crossing
investment projects which are carried out. If a potential host country increases its
taxes, it will deter projects which produce high prots in the host country (and
low prots or losses in the country where the parent company resides). At the
same time, this country will attract more projects which produce low prots or
losses in the host country and high prots in the country where the parent company
resides. As a result, the quantity of capital imports may increase, decline or remain
constant in response to the higher tax. But the quality of inbound investment in
the host country as measured by its contribution to the domestic prot tax base
will unambiguously deteriorate. This is what we call the composition e¤ect of
corporate taxation on cross-border investment.
The composition e¤ect has some important implications. Firstly, the welfare
cost of tax distortions may be higher than suggested by studies focusing on the
quantity aspect alone. Secondly, as mentioned above, observed tax induced prof-
itability di¤erences may not only be due to the shifting of book prots across
countries. Thirdly and more generally, policies which aim at attracting foreign
direct investment may have to pay more attention to the qualitative dimension of
this investment.
The rest of the chapter is set up as follows. In subchapter 3.2, we present the
model. Subchapter 3.3 discusses some extensions. In 3.4, we provide suggestive
evidence for the main hypotheses. Subchapter 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The model
In this subchapter, the model setup is presented (3.2.1) before we derive tax e¤ects
on investment quality (3.2.2). Then, tax rate e¤ects on tax revenues are considered
(3.2.3). Finally, we ask for the optimal tax policy strategy and tax e¤ects on welfare
(3.2.4).
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3.2.1 Setup
The world consists of two countries, domestic and foreign. In the domestic country,
there is a representative household endowed with N units of capital. Moreover,
there are many identical rms which have some ongoing production in the two
countries. These rms consider investment projects in the foreign country. Cross-
border investment has two e¤ects. Firstly, the project generates prot income (or
losses) in the foreign investment location, denoted by . Henceforth, the asterisk
denotes the location in the foreign country. Secondly, the prot of the domestic
investor rm generated in its country of residence changes by .5
More formally, each domestic rm i randomly draws a project and then decides
whether or not realize it. The project is characterized by a pair (i;i ) of prot
changes at the investors and the investment location. ; are two jointly dis-
tributed variables (;) 2 R2. For simplicity, we assume that the two variables
are uniformly distributed over the intervals  2 f ;+g and  2 f ;+g.
Each project requires one unit of capital which can be rented at a price of  in the
world capital market.
Standard models virtually always assume that  is equal to zero. It is the
main novelty of this model to allow for prot level changes in the investor rm, i.e.
we consider positive, negative or zero values of . In other words, the investment
project may e¤ectively increase or decrease prots of the parent company, or it
may not a¤ect them at all. If  < 0 , the transaction reduces the prots of the
parent company. A possible reason would be that the new subsidiary produces
a good which competes with products exported by the parent company.  > 0,
i.e. an increase in prots of the parent company, may occur, for instance, if the
subsidiary owns technical knowledge or o¤ers market access which is benecial to
the parent company.
Thus, in the absence of taxes, the prot of a border crossing investment project
is:
+    (3.1)
5In the following, we will use the terms prot and prot changes equivalently. The term prot
is more adequate if new production facilities are established, whereas prot change is more exact
if existing production plants are modied, i.e. in the course of an acquisition or merger.
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Denote by c the marginal project for a given. In equilibrium, each marginal
project will satisfy +c = :
Now, taxes are introduced. In our model, prots are subject to corporate in-
come taxes. Foreign source income is exempt from domestic tax, i.e. we assume
that international investment income is taxed according to the exemption system.
The nontax capital cost is not deductible, i.e. we assume equity nancing. Pro-
jects are realized if posttax-prots, aggregated over the domestic and the foreign
location, are nonnegative, i.e. (1  )+ (1   )  , where  is the domestic
corporate tax rate and   is the corporate tax rate of the foreign country. For each
, there is a marginal project which satises:
c =

1     

1  
1   

(3.2)
Projects with  < c are not realized. The right hand side of (3.2) may be
interpreted as the cost of capital of foreign direct investment. The rst term is
increasing in  and the corporate tax rate of the country where the investment
is located. This e¤ect is well known from standard tax models of international
investment. The second term on the right hand side of (3.2) is in the focus of
this chapter. It reects that the new foreign investment project may a¤ect the
ongoing activity of the multinational rm in its country of residence. If  > 0,
the second term reduces the cost of capital. The reason is that foreign investment
increases the prots of the parent company. Accordingly,  < 0 implies that
foreign investment reduces domestic prots, so that the minimum foreign prot
required to make the project worthwhile increases.
The foreign country has no capital endowment. It only imports capital and
taxes prots generated by investment of multinational rms. This asymmetry
assumption is made for the following reason. In this setup, investment of multina-
tional rms in the foreign country is the only source of capital demand. Given that
the supply of capital is xed, the quantity of capital exported from the domestic
country to the foreign country is given. This allows us to focus on the quality side
of capital ows. In 3.3.1, we extend the model to allow for changes in both the
quality and the quantity of border crossing capital ows.
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3.2.2 Tax rate e¤ects on investment quality
Equation (3.2) shows that taxes may distort investment. In the standard model,
with  = 0, the implications are clearcut. For  > 0, it follows c > , i.e. the
return of the marginal unit of capital invested abroad is lower than the marginal
return in the absence of taxes. In contrast, if we allow for  6= 0, the picture may
change. For large and positive , the minimum required project returns at the
investment location c may become negative. This has important consequences
for the e¤ect of corporate taxation on investment. Holding  constant, a marginal
increase of the domestic and foreign corporate tax rate has the following e¤ect on
outbound investment:
@c
@ 
=
c
1    and
@c
@
=

1    (3.3)
These expressions can be interpreted as follows. A positive sign of the derivative
means that a tax rate increase raises the required prot of the foreign investment
project. In this case, higher taxes deter investment. Accordingly, negative values
represent cases where higher taxes increase investment. Now, consider the standard
case with  = 0. In this case, it follows from equation (3.2) that c > 0, i.e.
the prot change in the foreign country caused by the marginal investment project
must be positive. In this case, higher foreign taxes deter investment (@
c
@ ).  = 0
also implies that domestic corporate taxes do not a¤ect outbound investment, i.e.
@c
@
= 0.
This changes if we allow foreign investment to a¤ect the prots of the domestic
parent company, i.e.  6= 0. If is positive and su¢ ciently large, the prot change
at the investment location caused by the marginal project (c) becomes negative,
i.e. c < 0. In this case, the e¤ect of corporate taxes on investment is reversed:
@c
@ < 0. In other words, higher foreign tax rates c.p. increase investment in
the foreign country. The reason is that the after tax cost of the decline in foreign
prots caused by the marginal investment project is smaller, the higher the tax
rate. The other interesting e¤ect is that corporate taxes in the domestic country
may c.p. deter outbound investment. This also occurs if the prot change at the
parent company location is positive: @
c
@
= 
1  > 0.
So far, we have discussed the e¤ects of tax changes in our model assuming that
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the interest rate  is constant. But of course, a variation in the tax rate will also
change the interest rate  in our model. Total tax e¤ects are therefore given by
dc
d 
=
c
1    +
1
1   
d
d 
(3.4)
The capital market equilibrium is given by the equationZ +
 
Z +
c(; ;)
dd = N (3.5)
Since the supply of capital is xed,  will adjust to tax changes so that overall
capital demand remains constant. Total di¤erentiation yields
d
d 
=  
R +
 
@c
@ dR +
 
@c
@
d
=  
Z +
 
cd   c (3.6)
where we have used
R +
  d = 1.
c can be interpreted as the average host
country prot generated by the marginal projects (c). The total e¤ect of a
change in the foreign tax rate on investment is therefore given by
dc
d 
=
1
1   
 
c   c =   (1  )
(1   )2
 
   (3.7)
where   R +
  d is the average . Equation (3.7) is of key importance for
our analysis. It has the following interpretation. Depending on the value of  , c
may be larger or smaller than c. Consider rst the rms where c > c. These
are marginal projects where the prot generated in the foreign country is above the
average of all marginal projects. Accordingly, prots generated by these projects
in the domestic country are lower than on average
 
 < 

. These investment
projects will be crowded out by higher foreign taxes (d
c
d > 0). They will be
replaced by an expansion of projects which generate lower than average prots
in the foreign country
 
c < c

. This substitution of projects which generate
high foreign prots by projects which generate lower foreign prots or even losses
is what we refer to as the composition e¤ect of corporate taxation on foreign direct
investment. While the mere quantity cannot change in our model, the quality of
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foreign direct investment changes. If a country increases its tax rate, it attracts
fewer projects which generate local prots and more project which generate prots
somewhere else.
In parallel to equations (3.4) and (3.6), we can derive d
c
d
= 
1  +
1
1 
d
d
and
d
d
=   R +
  d    . The e¤ect of a small increase of the domestic corporate
tax rate on outbound investment is then given by
dc
d
=
1
1   
 
   =   1
1  
 
c   c (3.8)
which can interpreted equivalently. Note that, again, the tax e¤ect of foreign
taxes on foreign inbound investment would be zero in the standard model. The
reason is that the number of projects is xed and does not change in response to
changes in  .
These results can be summarized as
Proposition 4 Composition e¤ect: In the presence of feedback e¤ects of foreign
investment on domestic performance, an increase in the corporate tax rate changes
the quality of investment projects. If the overall number of projects is xed, an
increase in foreign taxes leads to a decline in investment in the foreign country
with above average foreign protability
 
c > c

and an increase in investment
with below average foreign protability
 
c < c

. An increase in the domestic
tax rate has the opposite e¤ect.
Figure 3-1 illustrates the e¤ects of corporate taxation on investment decisions
in our model, seen from the perspective of a high-tax country, i.e. assuming that
 >  . The lines that separate the hatched area from the blank one show the locus
of marginal investment as a function of di¤erent values for  and . Consider
rst the case without taxes, depicted on the left hand side of the gure. At the
margin, c =  if  = 0, and  =  if c = 0. The slope of the curve is given
by d
dc =  1. All transactions above the line will be realized whereas possible
investment projects in the shaded area are rejected.
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Figure 3-1 - The composition e¤ect of corporate taxation on foreign investment
The graph in the center of gure 3-1 illustrates the space of feasible investment
in the presence of taxes assuming  >  . Note that, if both tax rates  and   are
equal,  adjusts until all capital is employed. Then, the graph is the same as on the
left hand side with points of intersection 
1  ,

1  . For  6=  , though, the points
of intersection with the x- and the y-axis are shifted according to equation (3.2).
The slope of the marginal investment curve becomes steeper, d
dc =  1 

1  <  1.
Corporate taxes now have two e¤ects: The rst is that projects are not realized any
more in the low-tax country that would have been in the absence of taxes (hatched
area above the no-tax-line). But, in addition, some projects are now realized that
would not have been without taxes (shaded area beneath the no-tax-line). These
projects are characterized by high positive prot changes in the foreign country
and negative prot changes in the domestic high-tax country. The graph on the
right hand side shows the case of  <  . The slope of the marginal investment
line is atter now, d
dc >  1. There are some projects (high , low ) which
are not realized anymore and some projects realized which were rejected in the
absence of taxes (low , high ).
3.2.3 Tax rate e¤ects on tax revenue
What are the e¤ects of tax rate increases on tax revenue if the quality dimension
matters? Before we derive these e¤ects in our model, recall the standard model.
An increase in corporate tax rates has essentially two e¤ects. It increases revenue
by raising the tax burden for each project, and it decreases revenue by lowering the
number of projects carried out. These countervailing e¤ects generate the typical
shape of the La¤er-curve which has a maximum at the revenue-maximizing tax
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rate. But if the number of projects is xed, there is no countervailing e¤ect in
the standard model, since there is no qualitative dimension, and the revenue-
maximizing tax rate would be  = 100%.
In our model, the tax revenue of the foreign, capital importing country is given
by
T  =  B =  
Z +
 
Z +
c
dd (3.9)
where B denotes the tax base. A small increase in the corporate tax rate  
has the following e¤ect: dT  = d B +  dB =
 
B +   @B

@

d  +   @B

@
d .
dB can be expressed as
dB =  
Z +
 
@c
@ 
dd   
Z +
 
@c
@
dd (3.10)
Using equation (3.6), it follows:
dB
d 
=   1
1   var (
c) < 0 (3.11)
where var (c) is the variance of c.6 In the standard model, there is no
qualitative dimension of investment, and therefore var (c) = 0. In this model,
where var (c) > 0, an increase in the foreign tax rate decreases the foreign tax
base because of the composition e¤ect, i.e. because the tax increase leads to a
substitution of investment projects with a high local protability by projects with
lower prots. The e¤ect of the tax increase on foreign tax revenue is
dT 
d 
= B   

1   var (
c) (3.12)
Consider next the e¤ect of an increase in the domestic tax rate on tax revenue
in the foreign country. The derivation is analogous and yields
dT 
d
=   

1    cov (;
c) (3.13)
6The variance is given by var (c) =
R+
  
c2d 
R+
  
cd
2
.
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where cov (;c) is the covariance of  and c.7 Equation (3.2) implies
that the covariances are negative. Therefore, an increase in the domestic tax rate
increases foreign tax revenue: dT

d
> 0. In the same way, we can derive the e¤ects
of tax changes on domestic tax revenue. The impact of a change in the domestic
tax rate is
dT
d
= B   
1   var () (3.14)
where var () is the variance of .8 A change in the foreign tax rate yields
dT
d 
=   
1    cov (;
c) : (3.15)
These results may be summarized as
Proposition 5 An increase in the foreign tax rate unambiguously reduces the for-
eign tax base and increases the domestic tax base (and vice versa), although the
number of projects remains constant.
The unambiguously negative e¤ect of a tax increase on the domestic tax base
is due to the composition e¤ect of corporate taxation. The tax increase encourages
investment projects which produce losses and discourages protable projects.
This e¤ect of investment on tax revenue is one of the empirically testable implic-
ations of our model. If our model actually explains part of real world investment
ows then we should observe that high-tax countries have less gain from inbound
investment in terms of tax revenue than low-tax countries. In subchapter 3.4, we
test this hypothesis empirically. We nd that the higher the tax rate the lower is
the additional tax revenue per unit of foreign direct investment. Above a certain
level of the tax rate the contribution of FDI to tax revenues even becomes negative.
3.2.4 Optimal tax policy and welfare
In this subchapter, we derive the optimal tax policy of the doemstic and the
foreign country. In both countries, the governments maximize the welfare of a
7The covariance is given by cov (;c) =
R+
  
cdd 
R+
  
cd
R+
  d

.
8The variance is given by var () =
R+
  
2d 
R+
  d
2
.
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representative household. Consider rst the domestic country. The welfare of
the domestic household (W ) is assumed to depend on private consumption C
and publicly provided goods G: W = W (C;G): To ease notation, we assume
W = C+H (G). Private consumption is given by the private return to investment
C = N +
Z +
 
Z +
c
[ (1  ) +  (1   )  ] dd (3.16)
Since the entire capital stock and all rms belong to the domestic household
(3.16) boils down to
C =
Z +
 
Z +
c
[ (1  ) +  (1   )] dd (3.17)
G is nanced by corporate tax revenues only. Domestic welfare is given by
W =
Z +
 
Z +
c
[ (1  ) +  (1   )] dd+H
 

Z +
 
Z +
c
dd
!
(3.18)
The e¤ect of a small increase in  on domestic welfare is given by dW
d
=
@W
@
+ @W
@
d
d
. After some rearrangements, presented in the appendix, it follows
dW
d
= (H 0   1)
Z +
 
Z +
c
dd H 0 
1   var () (3.19)
The optimal tax policy involves the following tradeo¤: The rst term on the
right hand side of (3.19) reects that a higher tax rate shifts income from the
domestic household to the government. This increases welfare if the marginal util-
ity from public consumption exceeds the marginal utility of private consumption
H 0   1 > 0. The second term is unambiguously negative if the tax rate is positive
and reects that a tax rate increase reduces the tax base. This trade-o¤ is familiar
from standard models of tax policy in models with capital mobility. The di¤erence
is that the tax base e¤ect results from a change in the quality of investment, ratehr
than the quantity.
How does an increase in the foreign tax rate a¤ect domestic welfare? The
welfare e¤ect is given by dW
d =
@W
@+
@W
@
@
@ which can be rearranged (see appendix)
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to
dW
d 
=  
Z +
 
Z +
c
dd H 0 
1    cov (;
c) (3.20)
The rst term on the r.h.s. of (3.20) is negative and reects that an increase
in the foreign tax reduces the prot income of domestic households.9 The second
term is unambiguously positive. It represents the positive scal externality of a
foreign tax rate increase on domestic tax revenue. The overall welfare e¤ect is
ambiguous.
The foreign country maximizes revenue from taxing rms. It benets from an
increase in domestic taxes. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully analyze
tax competition in the presence of quality aspects of investment. However, it is
clear that the scope and the direction of potential coordination policies depends
on the scal externalities mentioned above. The scal externalities are similar to
those in the standard model.
3.3 Extension: Quality and quantity dimensions
So far, we have assumed that the number of projects realized by domestic investors
in the foreign country is xed. We now relax this assumption by introducing a
world capital market with an exogenously given interest rate of r. Firms may use
the rented capital to nance cross-border investment projects. This implies that
the marginal project is dened as yielding a return which equals the world interest
rate r:
c (1   ) +  (1  ) = r (3.21)
Assuming that the interest rate does not react to tax changes, tax e¤ects are
given by
@c
@ 
=
c
1    and
@c
@
=

1    (3.22)
Aggregate investment, i.e. the overall number investment projects realized in
9From the viewpoint of the foreign government, the domestic ownership of foreign assets may
imply the incentive to overtax corporate prots, see Huizinga and Nielsen (1997).
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the foreign country (K), is now endogenously determined and equal to:
K =
Z 
 
Z +
c
dd (3.23)
At a given interest rate in the world capital market, a marginal increase in the
foreign corporate tax rate has the following e¤ect on aggregate investment:
@K
@ 
=  
Z 
 
@c
@ 
d =  
c
1    (3.24)
The tax e¤ect on investment depends on an expression, c =
R 
  
cd,
which can be interpreted as the mean marginal prot generated by foreign invest-
ment in the foreign country. In the standard model, this expression is equal to
@K
@ =   r(1 )2 since  is assumed to be zero and therefore c is equal to r1  .
In our model, though, the expression can be negative. In this case higher taxes
increase inbound investment, seen from the foreign governments perspective. The
possibility that higher taxes may attract additional investment is due to the fact
that the value of losses is higher with high tax rates. If projects with negative mar-
ginal prots dominate, an increase in the corporate tax rate increases the value of
these projects and leads to an increase in total investment.
Thus, we may state that the qualitative aspects of investment may dominate the
quantitative side. In the case of
R 
  
cd = 0, tax rate variations do not change
the number of projects at all (although the number of projects is endogenously
determined), but they have a composition e¤ect, i.e. they change the qualitative
dimension of investment ows.
What are the e¤ects on tax revenue if we allow for the quantitative dimension
of investment? Tax revenue is given by
T  =  B =  
Z +
 
Z +
c
cdd (3.25)
where B is the tax base. In the standard model, the e¤ect of a small increase of
the corporate tax rate on the tax base is negative because higher tax rates reduce
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the capital stock. In our model, the e¤ect is given by
@T 
@ 
= B   

1   
Z +
 
c2d (3.26)
Thus, although a higher tax may increase or decrease the foreign capital stock,
the e¤ect of a higher foreign tax rate on the tax base is unambiguously negative.
The rst term on the right hand side is the revenue increasing e¤ect of increasing
the tax rate with a given tax base. The second term denotes the tax rate e¤ect on
the tax base which is negative.
These results may be summarized as
Proposition 6 An increase in the foreign tax rate may increase or decrease ag-
gregate investment in the foreign country but always reduces the foreign corporate
income tax base.
3.4 Empirical analysis
In this subchapter, we provide some suggestive evidence for the relevance of the
composition e¤ect of corporate taxation on FDI. It seems that, fortunately, there
is already a large number of papers which may be interpreted as providing evid-
ence for the existence of the composition e¤ect and the qualitative dimension of
FDI. The empirical literature on tax e¤ects on prot-shifting usually starts from
the observation that the returns per unit of capital (our  and ) di¤er between
domestic and foreign a¢ liates within a multinational company, and that the dif-
ference depends on the tax rate di¤erential between the two jurisdictions. These
contributions implicitely assume that, besides prot-shifting, capital returns in
the domestic and the foreign a¢ liate do not depend on each other. This is a very
strong assumption. If foreign investment projects have feedback e¤ects on domestic
prots, then the observed e¤ects may arise even in the absence of prot-shifting.
If investment has a qualitative dimension, high tax countries will be more likely
than low tax countries to attract investment projects which lead to low or zero
tax payments (or even negative tax payments when the losses can be set against
other income). In the following, we therefore measure the impact of FDI on tax
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revenue. The above presented model predicts that high-tax countries will attract
FDI that increases their tax revenues less than FDI in low-tax countries does. We
will estimate an equation of the following form:
Tax base = 0+1Tax rate+2FDI+3FDITax rate+
X
jX+" (3.27)
If there is a composition e¤ect on FDI, a higher tax rate will lower the increase
in tax revenue per unit of incoming FDI or even decrease it in absolute terms.
That means that the model predicts a negative estimated coe¢ cient 3. Note that
in the standard model taxes decrease the quantity of FDI. But when the quantity
is controlled for, there is no prediction for the sign or the size of 3. Note further
that the model yields symmetric predictions for inbound and outbound FDI. Both
directions of investment should have a negative estimate of 3.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistic of the main variables used for estimation.
It reports the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation and the
median value.
Table 3.1: Summary statistic
No. obs. Mean St.dev. Median
EATR 468 0.3052 0.0685 0.2800
Tax rate 479 0.4082 0.0924 0.3900
Tax revenue 388 0.0302 0.0144 0.0285
Tax base 368 0.0802 0.0734 0.0441
Corporate VA 235 0.5534 0.0796 0.5639
Gross operating surplus 304 0.1981 0.0358 0.2003
Inbound FDI 398 0.1859 0.1696 0.1413
Outbound FDI 392 0.2432 0.3060 0.1444
GDP 405 1,154,263 1,924,153 373,573
Note: Data sources are given in the text.
All numbers represent shares of GDP except for tax rates and GDP itself.
The EATR and the (statutory) tax rates are taken from the IFS corporate tax
database described in Devereux et al. (2002). For countries not included in the
IFS database we added tax rates from KPMG (2006). The tax revenue gures are
taken from the OECD database, as well as the share of corporate value added and
the gross operating surplus. The tax base is calculated by dividing tax revenues
through statutory tax rates. Since this is no perfect measure, we run regression
for both tax bases and revenues. Inbound and outbound FDI are provided by
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UNCTAD. It would be useful to have FDI-weighted investor country tax rates.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the share of FDI for which we have tax rate data
is too low to construct reliable indicators. Therefore, our estimations are based on
the assumption that the host tax rates are a good measure for the (relative) tax
burden. This is necessarily true in the aggregate but it may generate biases for
individual countries.
Table 3.2 reports the results of ve di¤erent estimation specications. All
specications use host country xed e¤ects and year xed e¤ects. In column
1, regression results of equation (3.27) are presented with the FDI term split in
inbound and outbound FDI stocks. As expected, the gross operating surplus has
high predictive power for the size of the tax base. The inbound and outbound
terms are not signicant. However, their coe¢ cients show the same signs and the
same structure. Whereas inbound and outbound FDI have a positive coe¢ cient,
the interaction terms are negative. Since both inbound and outboud FDI are highly
correlated the lack of signicance is potentially due to collinearity. Since our model
yields symmetric predictions for both directions of FDI, i.e. both incoming and
outgoing FDI are supposed to have negative interaction terms with the EATR (or
other tax indicator), we go on by using total FDI which is the sum of the two
variables.
And, indeed, using the sum of FDI instead of inbound and outbound FDI
separately yields signicant coe¢ cient estimates for the FDI term which similar
properties compared to the estimations reported in column 1. The coe¢ cients
have the expected signs: In general, foreign direct investment increases the tax
base. However, high-tax countries gain less tax base or even lose some fraction
of the tax base. The control variables remain virtually the same and also the
R-squared does not decrease.
It may be that the coe¢ cient estimates for the FDI terms are artefacts if high-
tax countries di¤er systematically from low-tax countries with regard to other
variables. In column 3, we therefore add interaction terms with the EATR for the
control variables. The FDI coe¢ cients are slightly decreased but remain strongly
signicant.
How should the results be interpreted? The estimation reported in column 3
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suggests that a marginal increase in FDI has the following e¤ect on the tax base
@ (Tax base=GDP )
@ (FDI=GDP )
= 0:1930  0:6275 EATR
This means that FDI does not add anything to the tax base and even reduces
it above a tax rate of 30%. Whereas Germany is predicted to lose tax base on
average with its EATR tax rates of 0.32 (in 2005), the UK and France gain with
tax rates at 0.24 and 0.25. The US (0.29) taxbase is virtually una¤ected by FDI.
Table 3.2: Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
EATR EATR EATR EATR Stat. tax rate EATR Stat. tax rate
EATR 0.0872 0.0841 0.2718 0.1865 0.0291
(0.0659) (0.0617) (0.2403) (0.1924) (0.0868)
Statutory tax rate 0.5511 0.1595
(0.1659)** (0.0545)**
Corporate VA -0.2479 -0.2619 -0.0305 0.0041 -0.0827 -0.0363
(0.1883) (0.1593) (0.1597) (0.1560) (0.0526) (0.0541)
Corp VA x TR -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
Gross operating 0.8913 0.9336 1.2679 1.0510 1.6395 0.2238 0.3898
    surplus (0.1795)** (0.1321)** (0.3146)** (0.2827)** (0.3168)** (0.1060)* (0.0966)**
GOS x TR -1.5318 -1.2175 -2.4204 0.2917 -0.3233
(0.9854) (0.9308) (0.7098)** (0.3599) (0.2356)
Inbound FDI 0.2571
(0.2215) Total FDI 0.2474 0.1930 0.1859 0.1724 0.0532 0.0453
Inbound FDI -0.9970 (0.0466)** (0.0451)** (0.0416)** (0.0423)** (0.0138)** (0.0127)**
    x TR (0.8369)
Outbound FDI 0.1599 Total FDI -0.8159 -0.6275 -0.6106 -0.4787 -0.1795 -0.1239
(0.1596) x TR (0.1726)** (0.1636)** (0.1515)** (0.1213)** (0.0515)** (0.0384)**
Outbound FDI -0.4401
     x TR (0.6538)
GDP 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)** (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)**
GDP x TR 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)*
Constant 0.0199 0.0180 -0.1466 -0.1230 -0.2741 0.0115 -0.0601
(0.0883) (0.0820) (0.1095) (0.0598)* (0.1117)* (0.0361) (0.0364)
Observations 215 215 215 283 226 215 226
No. of countries 15 15 15 18 16 15 16
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.63 0.64
Tax base Tax revenue
Notes: Dependent variables are tax base (columns 1-5) and tax revenue (columns 6 and 7), both measured as a fraction of GDP. All
specifications use year and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Corporate value
added, gross operating surplus and FDI are measured as a fraction of GDP as well. TR stands for EATR or the statutory tax rate, respectively;
see column headline.
Columns 4 to 7 include some robustness checks. In column 4, we repeat the
regression without the corporate value added of which we only have data for a
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limited number of countries and periods. The number of observations is increased
to 283. The results remain stable, though. In column 4 we use the statutory tax
rate as a control variable and as interaction variable. The results are qualitatively
the same; the statutory tax rate at which the contribution of FDI to the tax base
becomes zero is equal to 36%. Germany and the USA are above this level, the UK
and France are beneath.
In columns 6 and 7, tax revenues are used as a dependent variable and are re-
gressed, and the tax variable is the EATR and the statutory tax rate, respectively.
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. The tax indicators
at which FDI does not contribute to tax revenues anymore is 29:6% and 36:6%,
respectively.
3.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
The main contribution of this chapter is to relax the assumption that foreign direct
investment of multinational rms only a¤ects prots at the investment location
itself. We introduce investment projects that yield prot changes at the investment
and the investors location. Therefore, the marginal prot level at the investment
location does not need to be equal to the cost of capital as dened in the usual
way. Depending on the prot change at the investors location, it can be higher or
lower.
Our analysis implies that there is a dimension of capital ows which is largely
neglected by the standard model: the quality dimension. With negative local
prots generated by marginal projects, higher inbound investment may reduce the
domestic tax base. This is conrmed by the evidence presented in this chapter.
Using aggregate investment and tax revenue data, we nd that, on average, high-
tax countries lose tax revenue in response to incoming FDI while low-tax countries
gain tax revenue. We calculate a break-even e¤ective average tax rate of 30 per
cent at which the contribution of an additional unit of FDI has a zero impact on
tax revenues. Above this rate, incoming FDI decreases tax revenues.
The idea that higher taxes reduce the tax base is familiar from studies on tax
induced prot-shifting. These studies argue that rms react to international tax
di¤erences by shifting book prots from high tax countries to low tax countries by
3.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 51
means of transfer pricing or intra rm debt contracts, so that reported prots are
lower in high tax countries. Our theory, in contrast, explains these di¤erences as a
result of tax induced project selection. This does not stand in direct opposition to
the prot-shifting story, it rather o¤ers a complementary explanation. However,
accounting for project selection, as opposed to prot-shifting, may have important
consequences for empirical estimations on the one hand and policy recommenda-
tions on the other hand.
Firstly, a large part of the empirical literature on prot-shifting starts from the
observation that protability is higher in low-tax a¢ liates than in high-tax a¢ li-
ates. These tax-related di¤erences are interpreted as a result of prot-shifting, see
e.g. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga and Laeven (2007)
and Weichenrieder (2007). Accounting for project selection as an alternative ex-
planation suggests that associating all tax-related protability di¤erences solely
with prot-shifting activities will overestimate its importance. Project selection
therefore is a possible explanation for the puzzle that international prot-shifting is
large when measured through cross-country protability di¤erences, as in Huizinga
and Laeven (2007), but small when the use of prot-shifting instruments is con-
sidered. E.g., Laeven, Nicodème and Huizinga (2007) and Buettner and Wamser
(2007) show that taxes only have a small impact on the use of intra-rm loans.
With regard to transfer pricing, the evidence is rather mixed. Whereas Swenson
(2001) only nds a small impact of taxes on trade prices, Clausing (2003) reports a
considerable inuence. In contrast, tax practitioners report that the use of transfer
pricing is substantially limited by legal provisions of the high-tax countries.
Clearly, the empirical analysis presented in the chapter does not provide evid-
ence in favour of project selection as opposed to prot-shifting. Even though it
would be highly desirable, it seems hard to test empirically which part of the tax
driven protability di¤erences is due to prot-shifting and which part is explained
by real economic e¤ects.
Secondly, when it comes to policy implications, it is important to know whether
protability di¤erences are due to prot-shifting or project selection. If we inter-
pret all tax induced protability di¤erences as a result of prot-shifting, it is
natural to conclude that anti tax avoidance measures like e.g. transfer pricing
documentation requirements or thin capitalization rules may increase corporate
52 CHAPTER 3. FEEDBACK EFFECTS
tax revenues. But if the composition e¤ect partly explains these di¤erences, the
revenue raising potential of measures directed against the shifting of book prots
is overestimated. Given that these policies may imply substantial costs and dis-
tortions of rm behavior, a misinterpretation of the data may lead to unnecessary
welfare losses.
Another important implication of our analysis is that, if marginal prots are
allowed to be negative, then the e¤ects of tax changes on the quantity of investment
can be reversed: Higher taxes may attract more investment, lower taxes may deter
investment. From 1990 to 2000, Germany increased its stock of foreign held capital
by about 520% (source: OECD) and performed much better in attracting foreign
FDI than the UK (115%), France (205%), the US (180%) or Japan (410%). The
standard way of reading these gures is that Germany attracted FDI despite its
relatively high tax rates (before the tax reform in 2001, the corporate tax rates in
Germany were between 52% and 58% and thus among the highest throughout the
developed world). Our model provides an argument for a di¤erent interpretation:
It could be that Germany attracted as much FDI because of its high tax rates.
A broader issue raised by our analysis is that, from the perspective of a host
country, not every kind of inbound FDI is desirable. The quality dimension em-
phasized in our model suggests that there might be good types of inbound
investment projects (those which increase production, employment and tax pay-
ments) and badtypes (those which decrease activity and tax payments). Our
model thus makes a rst step towards providing a rationale for the skepticism to-
wards certain types of foreign inbound investment which has always been present
in the public debate.
Our model shows that more inbound investment can lead to smaller domestic
tax bases. This may explain why inbound investment - especially in the form
of m&a - is often regarded as not very attractive from the public point of view.
But our model also shows that high taxes attract this kind of harmful investment
projects. Thus, if our model captures some aspects of the real world, then tax
policy makers should not promisemore investment inows in response to a possible
tax cut but di¤erent investment inows.
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3.6 Appendix
This appendix derives equations (3.19) and (3.20). The partial derivative of welfare
with respect to  is given by
@W
@
= (H 0   1)
Z +
 
Z +
c
dd 
Z +
 

1   d H
0
"Z +
 

1   d
#
where we have used @
c
@
= 
1  . Taking the change in the price of capital into
account, the total tax e¤ect is dW
d
= W +W . Where as  is given in the text
in equation (3.6), W is equal to
W

=   
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   H
0 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 
d
using @
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Now, consider the partial derivative of W with respect to the foreign tax rate
 :
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where we used @
c
@ =
c
1  . Again, the total tax e¤ect is equal to
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Chapter 4
Heterogeneous prot-shifting
If tax rates cuts are not available as a policy instrument to attract mobile cap-
ital, governments can lower the level of tax enforcement in order to reduce the
e¤ective tax burden on multinational enterprises. In this chapter, optimal en-
forcement policy is reconsidered in the presence of heterogeneity in tax avoidance
opportunities. It is shown that, under certain circumstances, governments have
an incentive to choose ine¢ ciently high levels of tax enforcement. The reason is
that an individual government does not take into account that the tax avoiding
multinational reacts to higher enforcement by increasing investment in the foreign
country, thereby crowding out investment of other rms and e¤ectively reducing
the foreign tax base.1
4.1 Introduction
Slowly but steadily, political pressure for harmonized corporate taxation within
the European Union increases. The question arises what happens if tax rates are
harmonized while enforcement policies remain uncoordinated. The standard view,
rstly expressed by Cremer and Gahvari (2000), suggests that tax competition is
reintroduced through the backdoor which implies that equilibrium enforcement
is ine¢ ciently low. In this chapter, we review the existing arguments on the e¢ -
ciency properties of uncoordinated enforcement policies and add a complementary
1This chapter is based on Becker (2007).
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argument stating that, under certain circumstances, uncoordinated policies lead
to ine¢ ciently high levels of enforcement.
Tax enforcement is necessary because tax authorities have to rely on what
companies report as their taxable income. The complexity of the tax law, the
tax advisorscreativity and the fact that many transactions are not observable for
tax authorities make it possible that reported income deviates substantially from
trueincome. It is generally assumed that cross-border transactions multiply the
tax avoidance opportunities. Above all, this means access to tax havens which
requires a multinational rm structure. Tax havens are generally not used as a
location for real investment, they rather serve as pass-through entities whose sole
task is to reduce the tax payments of MNEs in their main location.
The use of tax havens may be the most important means by which corporations
avoid (or evade) taxes. But, in the context of this chapter (and most contributions
in this eld) tax havens are equivalent to other means of avoidance like the use of
black market, legal loopholes, simple underreporting etc. Therefore, the following
analysis on optimal enforcement or shutting down of tax havens can (and should
be) translated into the general issue of restricting corporate tax avoidance.
The discussion on competition over enforcement policies (i.e. shutting down
tax havens) have been fueled by two recent strands of literature which Slemrod
and Wilson (2006) call the tax-havens-are-good-literature. Firstly, empirical stud-
ies e.g. by Desai, Foley & Hines (2006a,b) show that multinational rms increase
their non-haven investment in response to tax haven investments. This raises the
question whether restriction of tax haven access from the perspective of an indi-
vidual country is truly desirable. Secondly, a recent contribution by Hong and
Smart (2007) claims that the existence of tax havens may paradoxically mitig-
ate tax competition pressure, and partial access to tax havens may be welfare-
enhancing. This opens the question whether more enforcement is desirable from a
world point of view.
We will proceed as follows. In the next subchapter, we briey review the lit-
erature and the standard arguments on the e¢ ciency and welfare properties of
uncoordinated enforcement activities. In subchapter 4.3, we present a model with
heterogeneous rms. Several cases are considered which allow analysing what
determines an e¢ cient enforcement equilibrium or under- or overenforcement.
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Subchapter 4.4 considers some model extensions. Subchapter 4.5 discusses the
results and concludes.
4.2 The literature
4.2.1 Corporate tax avoidance, prot-shifting and tax havens
from the empirical perspective
Slemrod (2001) establishes a trichotomy of corporate behavioral responses to
taxation. The rst type of response is timing of transaction, the second type
is accounting which includes the manipulation of book prots, the third type is
nally real decisions taking the form of investment, employment etc. Due to the
nature of tax avoidance, the direct observation of choices aiming at reducing the
tax burden is hard if not impossible. Therefore, most studies concentrate just on
a subset of tax avoidance instruments. In the context of this chapter, cross-border
prot-shifting and the use of tax havens are of greatest importance.
Generally spoken, multinational rms are able to declare prots in some juris-
diction where taxes are lower (or even zero) than in the location where prots are
generated (and where they should be declared from an economic point of view).
In principle, this kind of prot-shifting may occur in all situations where the MNE
has access to two di¤erent locations with a non-zero di¤erence in tax rates.
The importance of international income shifting is documented by a growing
empirical literature, see e.g. Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994) as
well as the recent contributions by Huizinga and Laeven (2007) and Weichenrieder
(2007). Since prot-shifting as a corporate choice has already been discussed in
chapter 3, it su¢ ces to state that all these studies nd a signicant and econom-
ically substantial impact of taxation on the location of prots. Recent initiatives
of the European Commission to implement a system of formula apportionment as
well as national measures taken to prevent prot-shifting (like thin capitalization
rules) show that also policy-makers believe that corporate tax avoidance through
cross-border channels is an issue.
An especially aggressive kind of prot-shifting occurs when the MNE invests in
a location and the only purpose of this investment is to prepare prot-shifting. If
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the location supports this kind of investment, it is called a tax haven.2 Depend-
ing on the denition, the number of tax havens is somewhere in the neighbourhood
of 40, see Dharmapala and Hines (2006). These countries receive extensive foreign
investment and have experienced rapid economic growth over the past 25 years, see
Hines (2005). Desai et al. (2006b) analyze which rms seek tax haven access, i.e.
the demand for tax havens, whereas Dharmapala and Hines (2006) deal with the
supply of tax haven services by asking which countries become tax havens. In the
last decade, the OECD and the European Union have taken various measures to
limit the extent to which multinational rms use tax havens. The current debate
hints at the remaining scope for both international organizations and individual
countries to take action against this kind of cross-border tax avoidance.
4.2.2 Tax havens are bad (or arent they?)
Tax havens attract substantial amounts of foreign direct investment. Even if this
capital is only passed through the tax haven and the real investment projects are
realized in other locations, there will be transaction costs involved which would
not be there in the absence of taxes. Thus, it seems obvious that the existence of
tax havens is detrimental with regard to e¢ ciency and welfare. The incentives for
an individual country to shut down tax havens are potentially limited, as will be
discussed below, but it seems clear that an obvious policy recommendation for the
group of all non-haven countries is to eliminate all access to tax havens. Accord-
ingly, the existence of tax havens may be interpreted as reecting the inability of
non-haven countries to cooperate or the existence of costs of shutting down tax
havens. But, nevertheless, this does not alter the view that tax havens as such
reduce world welfare.
Recently, Hong and Smart (2007) questioned this consensus upon tax havens.
They apply an argument rstly developed by Keen (2001) in a slightly di¤erent
context and ask whether it is desirable to coordinate on shutting down all tax
2Whereas the OECD is more concerned about information exchange and transparency in its
denition of tax havens, see www.oecd.org/ctp/htp, Desai, Foley and Hines (2006b) dene tax
havens as low-tax jurisdictions that provide investors opportunities for tax avoidance.(p. 514)
In this chapter, I adopt this simple denition by assuming that tax havens are countries with
zero taxes.
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havens when coordination on tax rates fails. Under rather restrictive assumptions3,
they show that tax havens relax the pressure of tax competition on tax rates. The
reason is that allowing for tax haven access leads to an e¤ective discrimination
between the immobile and the mobile sectors, allows for higher e¤ective taxation
of immobile rms and thus mitigates the underprovision of public goods.
The argument brought forward by Hong and Smart (2007) has been criticized
by two papers. Slemrod and Wilson (2006) show in a di¤erent framework that
it is always optimal to shut down some tax havens. Bucovetsky and Hauer
(forthcoming) hint at potential distortions which may arise from loopholes for
multinational rms. If rms decide on their organizational form, i.e. whether being
a multinational or a national company, these loopholes may lead to an excessive
number of multinational rms and e¢ ciency losses.
4.2.3 The e¢ ciency properties of uncoordinated enforce-
ment policies
This chapter contributes to the discussion of the e¢ ciency properties of uncoordin-
ated enforcement policies.4 It is useful to start with a review of the arguments
concerning e¢ cient or ine¢ cient enforcement by assuming that tax rates are xed.
This may be the case because a subset of countries agreed upon coordination in
tax policy or because some other reasons make it impossible to adjust tax rates.5
Argument 1a: Assume that the rms decisions on optimal investment and
optimal prot-shifting do not depend on each other. Then, if prots are shifted
towards a jurisdiction with positive tax rates, enforcement may be excessively
high. The reason is that the government does not take into account that prot-
shifting generates a positive scal externality on the other countrys tax revenue.
3The authors assume that the corporate tax applies for two sectors. In the internationally
immobile sector, capital stocks are xed which implies an optimal tax rate of 100 per cent. This
means, though, that the capital return may fall beneath the world market interest rate which
will not be sustainable in the presence of positive rates of economic depreciation.
4Enforcement issues in general are discussed in Cowell (2004) and Slemrod (2004b).
5As the analysis in Hong and Smart (2007) shows, a simultaneous determination of tax rates
and enforcement levels only yields unambiguous results at the price of relatively strong assump-
tions. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter has to be interpreted for the case of harmonized
tax rates.
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If the other country, or tax haven, has zero tax rates, this externality is zero and
enforcement is e¢ cient.
Argument 1b: Under formula apportionment, enforcement may be too low
because of the positive e¤ect on the overall tax base which is distributed among
member countries. The common tax base is some kind of public good where an
individual country can free-ride on without contributing through increased enforce-
ment, see Becker and Fuest (2007c). The same argument can be made for federal
systems in which tax revenues have to be shared with other government tiers, see
Stöwhase and Traxler (2005). In both of these cases, the return to enforcement
has to be shared with other jurisdictional entities whereas the cost of enforcement
has to be born solely by the enforcing entity itself.
Argument 2 Assume that tax haven use a¤ects the cost of capital, as it has
rstly been analyzed by Grubert and Slemrod (1998). Alternatively, assume that
rms or projects are mobile, what Devereux and Gri¢ th (2003) call discrete
investment choices. In both cases, the restriction of tax haven use will a¤ect
investment since e¤ective tax rates are increased. Then, the standard tax com-
petition argument applies: E¤ective tax rates, i.e. enforcement, may be too low
because of the positive externalities of taxation on the other countrys welfare, see
Cremer and Gahvari (2000) for the general argument and Peralta, Wauthy and
Ypersele (2006) as well as Hong and Smart (2007) for an application to corporate
taxes. Grubert and Slemrod (1998) as well as Mintz and Smart (2004) provide
empirical evidence that the opportunity of income shifting a¤ects the volume and
the direction of investment. Desai, Foley and Hines (2006a) show that granting
access to tax havens increases domestic investment of US multinational rms.
Argument 3 If tax havens services face increasing marginal cost curves, as as-
sumed by Slemrod and Wilson (2006), then enforcement will be too high. The
reason is that the individual small country does not take into account that its
enforcement lowers the demand for tax haven services. Lower demand means
reduced prices and an increase in demand for tax haven services in all other non-
haven countries. Enforcement therefore has a negative external e¤ect which implies
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ine¢ ciently high enforcement levels in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Argument 4 If some rms are owned by foreigners, there is an additional reason
why governments should increase enforcement since the increased tax burden is
partially born by foreigners. This argument, rstly developed by Huizinga and
Nielsen (1997), can be combined with the former three arguments which implies
that enforcement becomes ine¢ ciently high(er) where it is e¢ cient or already too
high, and ine¢ ciently low(er) where it is too low in the absence of foreign rm
ownership.
4.2.4 The contribution of this chapter
The contribution of this chapter starts with the observation reported by Desai et al.
(2006a) who ask whether tax havens divert economic activityfrom non-havens.
Using US rm-level data, they nd that US investment increases in response to tax
haven investment. The authors do not draw welfare conclusions but the evidence
seems to suggest that the worst concerns are not justied by the data. However,
assuming that the world capital stock is xed, the increase in haven-using MNE
investment necessarily implies a reduction in investment of some other rm in some
(other) jurisdiction. With uncoordinated policies, the question of who reduces
activity where is of crucial importance.
In this chapter, we present a model in which rms have heterogeneous access to
a tax haven, i.e. in the stylized model, one rm has access, the other has none. Due
to general equilibrium e¤ects, giving access to tax havens reduces investment by
the non-haven-related MNE. We show that it depends on the relative protability
of the marginal investment how this policy has to be evaluated in terms of welfare.
With regard to the preceding subchapter, this chapter contributes the argu-
ment that enforcement may be too high because it drives out investment of the
rm that has access to the tax haven and thus increases haven-related investment
in the other country. By increasing enforcement, both countries try to increase
the quality of their investment, where good quality investment means non-haven
related investment. Since - by assumption - overall quality is xed, the increase
in quality has a negative externality on the other countrys quality or welfare,
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respectively. Therefore, overall enforcement levels are too high.
4.3 The model
In this subchapter, we present the model (4.3.1). Then, optimal enforcement is
considered for the general case (4.3.2) and four variants of the model (4.3.3 - 4.3.6).
4.3.1 The setup
Consider a world with two identical countries, called the domestic and the foreign
country, and a tax haven. The domestic and the foreign country are investment
locations, the tax haven only serves as a pass-through entity for shielding income
from tax.
In the domestic (foreign) country, there is a representative household owning
a fraction  (1   ) of the rm population in both countries. Moreover, the
household has a xed labor supply of L (L). The reservation wage is zero. The
asterisk denotes the foreign country. Thus, the consumption C of the domestic
household is given by
C =  ( + ) + wL (4.1)
where  and are  are total after-tax rm prots in the domestic and the
foreign country, respectively, and w is the domestic wage rate. Equivalently, the
foreign households consumption is given by
C = (1  ) ( + ) + wL (4.2)
Assume that there are two representative rms which consider investment pro-
jects in the domestic and the foreign location. The number of projects of both
rms is limited. Whether all projects are realized or not depends on the qual-
ity of the other rms projects, taxes, access to tax havens and so on. These
rms consider projects which yield a location-specic prot of i 2 fi ; i+g and
i 2 fi ; i+g, respectively, with i = 1; 2. Each project requires an input of
one unit of labor. Labor cost is denoted by w and is deductible from the corporate
tax base. The assumption of xed labour supply implies that the overall number
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of projects in each country is xed. As in Chapter 3, tax competition will therefore
a¤ect the quality but not the quantity of projects.6
The two rms di¤er in the access to tax havens. Firm 1 has access to tax
havens which means that it shifts a fraction a of its prots to the tax haven from
which it can be costlessly repatriated. Prot-shifting generates a cost c (a) with
c0; c00 > 0. Firm 2 has no access to the tax haven.
After-tax prots are thus given by
i =
 
i   w (1  ) + ai   c  ai for i = 1; 2 (4.3)
where a2 = 0. Projects abroad yield
i =
 
i   w (1  ) + ai   c  ai for i = 1; 2 (4.4)
where a2 = 0. The marginal project satises ic = 0 or 
i
c = 
i
c , depending
on whether the rm can realize just a subset or all of its projects. The marginal
project ic satises
ic   w +
(ai   c (a))
1   = max

0; ic   w +
ai   c (ai)
1  

(4.5)
In the former case, the rm stops investing when net prots are zero. In
the latter case, the rm equalizes net prots in both countries. Note that in
the presence of prot-shifting, the marginal investment, 1c = 0, implies that the
marginal pretax prot, 1c , is below the wage payment w: 
i
c w =  (
ai c(a))
1  . This
is due to the assumption that the opportunity of prot-shifting is project related.
A similar idea of modelling this can be found in Grubert & Slemrod (1998) where
the avoidance adjusted cost of capitalmay fall below the world market interest
rate. This assumption implies that, next to the project yield, there is some other
positive income, against which project-specic tax savings can be credited. In an
6Note that there is no capital in this model, at least not as an explicit model parameter.
However, the model can be reinterpreted as follows: Firms are endowed with rm-specic capital
which is already invested and needs a unit of labor to become productive. The heterogeneity
in  and  may be generated by di¤erent endowments of rm-specic capital or di¤erences in
capital quality. In such a model, the overall stock of capital is not xed, it rather depends on
the structure of the rm population which itself depends on taxes, wages etc.
64 CHAPTER 4. HETEROGENEOUS PROFIT-SHIFTING
extension, we consider the case in which tax payments per project are bound to
be non-negative.
In both countries, there is a benevolent government which is assumed to max-
imize its residentsutility. It has two policy instruments, the corporate tax rate
 and a policy variable  which regulates the access to tax havens. By setting ,
the government denes an upper bound to the tax haven access a chosen by the
multinational rm. We consider two cases. Firstly, optimal tax haven policies are
derived assuming that  can be set costlessly. Secondly, we account for the more
plausible case that restricting the access to tax havens is costly. The government
has to invest  in order to reduce tax haven access according to a function  ()
with 0 < 0 < 00.
Its budget constraint is therefore given by
G = 
"Z 1+
1c
 
1   w   a d1 + Z 2+
2c
 
2   w d2#   (4.6)
where a is the minimum of  or the optimally set a in the absence of tax haven
access restrictions.
4.3.2 Optimal policy against tax havens
In order to keep the analysis tractable, assume that the foreign and the domestic
country form a union with equal tax rates  =  . In contrast, enforcement which
means the regulation of tax haven access is not coordinated. The benevolent
government is supposed to maximize the welfare of its citizens. The representative
domestic household receives utility from private consumption C and a publicly
provided good G. The welfare function is given by W = U (C) +H (G), where C
is equal to
C = 
 Z 1+
1c
1d1 +
Z 1+
1c
1d1 +
Z 2+
2c
2d2 +
Z 2+
2c
2d2
!
+ wL
(4.7)
The public good G is given in equation (4.6).
Firstly consider that the government maximizes W by costlessly controlling
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, assuming that foreign wages and foreign policies are given. In the extensions
subchapter, we consider the case in which the government accounts for foreign
wage adjustments. How does investment react to changes in enforcement policies?
Di¤erentiating the cut-o¤ level ic with respect to , w, 
i
c and w
 gives
dic =
@ic
@
d+ dw +
@ic
@ic
dic +
@ic
@w
dw with i = 1; 2 (4.8)
with @
1
c
@
=    c0
1  and
@2c
@
= 0. Note that @
i
c
@ic
; @
i
c
@w = 0 if rm i earns zero
marginal prots. If the marginal project yields positive prots, an increase in
domestic projects implies a reduction of foreign prots, @
i
c
@ic
=  1, and foreign
wages a¤ect the number of domestic projects, @
i
c
@w =  1. Thus, the total tax
e¤ects depend on the assumptions on the marginal project. This will be discussed
in the next subchapters where di¤erent sets of assumptions are considered.
Optimal access to tax havens implies @W
@
= 0 with
@W
@
= U 0
Z
(   c0) d1  H 0
Z
d1 + ((1  ) (1  )U 0    (H 0   U 0)) @w
@
L
 H 0


 
1c   w   a
 d1c
d
+ 
 
2c   w
 d2c
d

(4.9)
The rst two terms on the right hand side include the net private gain from
prot-shifting and the loss in tax revenue. Even with full domestic ownership of
all rms,  = 1, these two terms are negative, given that H 0  U 0. The third term
represents the welfare e¤ect of wage responses to increased tax haven access. On
the one hand, with  < 1, there is a net gain from a wage increase because part
of the wage cost increase is born by foreign rms. On the other hand, if public
goods are underprovided, H 0 > U 0, then the increased deduction in response to
increased wages implies a welfare loss because tax revenue is c.p. decreased. In
the following, we will assume that
 <
(1  )U 0
H 0   U 0 + (1  )U 0 (4.10)
holds, which implies that the third term has the same sign as the wage rate
response to an increase in : @w
@
. If public goods underprovision gets less important,
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H 0   U 0  ! 0, then the required  approaches a maximum of 100%. The fourth
term denotes the welfare e¤ect due to a change in the tax base size.
If there is no enforcement, rms choose a level of shifting which satises  = c0.
It follows that @
1
c
@
= @
2
c
@
= 0, and accordingly, @w
@
= @w

@
= 0. Equation (4.9) then
boils down to
@W
@
=  H 0
Z
d1 < 0 (4.11)
This implies that governments have always the incentive to shut down some tax
havens. Whether it is desirable to shut down all tax haven access will be analyzed
in the di¤erent scenarios later on.
What are the e¤ects of foreign policies on domestic welfare?
@W
@
= U 0
Z
(    c0) d1 + (U 0 (1  )   (H 0   U 0)) @w
@
L
 H 0


 
1c   w   a
 d1c
d
+ 
 
2c   w
 d2c
d

(4.12)
The rst term on the r.h.s. is positive and reects the welfare gain due to
increased foreign income through an easier access to tax havens. The second term
represents the welfare e¤ect of wage changes. This e¤ect has the same sign as the
wage change if
 <
U 0
H 0
(4.13)
which is identical to the restriction in (4.10) for  = 0 and therefore larger, i.e.
less binding. The third term denotes the welfare e¤ect due to a change in the tax
base size in response to changes in the foreign access to tax havens.
Now, turn to the more plausible case that the restriction of the access to tax
havens has some cost. Optimal choice of  implies
@W
@
=
@W
@
@
@
  1 = 0 (4.14)
This implies that in the presence of an interior solution, the marginal welfare
e¤ect of restricting tax haven access is positive, @W
@
=
 
@
@
 1
< 0.
A coordinated increase in the expenditures for tax haven restrictions has the
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following e¤ect on domestic welfare:
@W
@
=
@W
@a
@
@
  1| {z }
=0
+
@W
@
@
@
=
@W
@
@
@
(4.15)
where  is the coordinated enforcement level.
In the following, we will consider four di¤erent scenarios which correspond to
four di¤erent stories about multinational investment, prot-shifting and enforce-
ment. It will be shown that the welfare implications di¤er substantially across
scenarios. Figure 4-1 summarizes the di¤erent scenarios. Each diagram has labor
on the abscissa and prots  and wages on the ordinate. Prots of rm 1 are
depicted on the left ordinate, prots of rm 2 on the right ordinate. In scenario
1, both rms do not realize all of their projects, i.e. both have marginal projects
with zero prots (see left hand graph in Figure 4-1). Scenario 2 assumes that
the haven-related rm realizes all of its projects, i.e. at the margin, the projects
yield a positive after-tax prot which is equal in both locations. In scenario 3, the
equivalent case for the non-haven related rm is discussed. Scenario 4 implies zero
wages because some labor remains unemployed; both rms have marginal projects
with positive prots.
w
1 1 1 12 2 22
w
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 4-1 - Four scenarios
4.3.3 Scenario 1: Both rms have marginal prots of zero
Consider rstly the case in which both rms do not realize all of their projects
since some of them yield a negative prot. This means that, for both rms, the
marginal project yields a prot of zero:
1c   w +
a  c (a)
1   = 0 and 
2
c   w = 0 (4.16)
68 CHAPTER 4. HETEROGENEOUS PROFIT-SHIFTING
In the appendix, it is shown that in this case wages respond to an increase in
 according to @w
@
=  1
2
@ic
@
. Therefore, total tax e¤ects according to (4.8) are
d1c
d
=
1
2
@1c
@
and
d2c
d
=  1
2
@1c
@
(4.17)
with @
1
c
@
=    c0
1  . Optimal access to tax havens is implied by
@W
@
= 0 with
@W
@
=  H 0
Z
d1 + U 0
Z
(   c0) d1 + (U 0 (1  ) (1  )   (H 0   U 0)) @w
@
L
 H 0 1c   w   a d1cd (4.18)
where we used d
1
c
d
=  d2c
d
and 2c   w = 0. As indicated above, the rst two
terms are negative in sum, and the marginal tax base is negative, too, 1c w a <
0. In contrast, there is a welfare gain from increased wages if (4.10) holds. If
this countervailing e¤ect is dominated by the negative e¤ects of increasing , the
optimal policy is therefore to set  = 0. If tax haven access is free and rms choose
a without restriction, equation (4.18) boils down to @W
@a
=  H 0 R dmi < 0. That
means, it is always welfare-enhancing to partially decrease tax haven access, cf.
Slemrod and Wilson (2006).
What are the e¤ects of foreign policies on domestic welfare?
@W
@
= U 0
Z
(    c0) d1 (4.19)
In the presence of domestic ownership of foreign rms,  > 0, granting access
to the tax haven has a positive external e¤ect on welfare. If enforcement is costly,
that means that enforcement is excessively high. Coordination on enforcement
policies would imply a reduction in  and :
@W
@
=
@W
@
@
@
< 0 (4.20)
Note that this is only true for the case of costly enforcement which ensures an
optimal level of  for which @W
@
= 0. Since, even at  = 0, @W
@a
< 0, coordination
policies would not imply an increase in : @W
@
+ @W

@
< 0 which follows from (4.18)
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and (4.19).
4.3.4 Scenario 2: Haven-MNE earns super-normal mar-
ginal prots
Now, assume that the rm with access to the tax haven realizes all of its projects.
That means that, at the margin, it equalizes prots at home and abroad. In
contrast, the second rm invests until the marginal prot is equal to zero.
1c   w  
a  c (a)
1   = 
i
c   w +
a   c (a)
1   and 
2
c   w = 0 (4.21)
In the appendix, we show that dw
d
=  2
3
@1c
@
=  dw
d
. This implies that total
tax e¤ects are given by
d1c
d
=
2
3
@1c
@
=  d
2
c
d
(4.22)
Optimal access to tax havens is implied by @W
@
= 0 which is given in (4.18).
As a di¤erence, the change in the tax base, 1c  w  a, may now be positive. The
domestic government now faces the trade-o¤ between a reduction in the tax base
due to increased prot-shifting and an increase in the tax base due to the higher
number of protable projects. Thus, it becomes possible that the optimal access
to tax havens is non-zero:  > 0. Such an equilibrium is more probable for very
high levels of tax base changes. We may therefore state
Proposition 7 For large values of the marginal change in tax base, 1c  w a, it
may be in the interest of the domestic country to partially grant access to the tax
haven.
The story of the second scenario is very much in line with some of the discus-
sions in the Are tax havens good or bad? literature. These debates are centered
around the presumption of an empirical correlation between protability and the
access to tax havens. If highly protable MNEs are those which have access to
and use tax havens, then scenario 2 applies.
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What are the e¤ects of restricting tax haven access on the other countrys
welfare? If the foreign government increases  domestic welfare changes according
to
@W
@
= U 0
Z
(    c0) d1 + (U 0 (1  )   (H 0   U 0)) @w
@
L
 H 0  1c   w   a d1cd (4.23)
In addition to the welfare gain due to domestic ownership of foreign rms
(rst term), there is a welfare loss due to lower wages, given that (4.13) holds.
Furthermore, the tax base change (third term) is negative for positive values of
1c   w   a since d
1
c
d > 0. If the tax base change is large enough, the whole
welfare change becomes negative. Coordination policy would imply an increase in
enforcement expenditures  and  because uncoordinated levels are too low due
to the positive externality of enforcement. We may therefore state
Proposition 8 Underenforcement as a strategic device: Under tax compet-
ition, governments are likely to choose levels of enforcement which are ine¢ ciently
low from a union point of view.
4.3.5 Scenario 3: Non-haven-MNE earns super-normal prots
Now, consider the opposite assumption compared to scenario 2. Assume that it
is the rm without access to tax havens which chooses between the domestic and
the foreign country as a location of its marginal project. In this case, wage e¤ects
as derived in the appendix are given by dw
d
=  2
3
@1c
@
and dw

d
=  1
3
@1c
@
. Total tax
e¤ects are therefore given by
d1c
d
=
@ic
@
  2
3
@1c
@
=
1
3
@1c
@
(4.24)
d2c
d
=  2
3
@1c
@
+
1
3
@1c
@
=  1
3
@1c
@
(4.25)
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The optimal access to tax havens implies
@W
@
=  H 0
Z
d1 + U 0
Z
(   c0) d1 + (U 0 (1  ) (1  )   (H 0   U 0)) @w
@
L
 H 0  1c   w   a   2c   w d1cd (4.26)
The rst three terms are the same as in (4.18). With 1c   w   a < 0 and
2c   w > 0, the reduction in 1c through an increase in  reduces the tax base
through two channels: It increases the number of tax-stealingtax-haven-related
projects and reduces the tax paying non-haven-projects.
What are the e¤ects of foreign policies on domestic welfare?
@W
@
= U 0
Z
(    c0) d1 + (U 0 (1  )   (H 0   U 0)) @w
@
L
+H 0
 
1c   w   a
   2c   w d1cd (4.27)
where we used d
1
c
da =  d
1
c
da
and d
2
c
da =  d
2
c
da
. With @w
@a > 0, and under (4.13), the
externality of increasing  on domestic welfare is unambiguously positive. That
means that increasing  has a negative externality which leads to ine¢ ciently
high levels of enforcement in the uncoordinated equilibrium - even in the absence
of domestic ownership of foreign rms:
@W
@
=
@W
@
@
@
< 0 for all  (4.28)
The reason is that each government has an incentive to drive out projects of
the rm with tax haven access. But, as the overall number of projects with tax
haven access is xed (by assumption), decreasing the number of domestic projects
with tax haven access necessarily increases its number in the foreign country. In
other words, the overall quality of investment is constant for the world. We may
therefore state
Proposition 9 Overenforcement as a strategic device: If the non-haven-
related MNE earns non-zero prots at the margin, the enforcement level, i.e. the
measures taken to improve investment quality, is ine¢ ciently high. Coordination
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on enforcement policies therefore implies a reduction of enforcement expenditures.
4.3.6 Scenario 4: Both MNEs earn super-normal prots
For sake of completeness, consider the case in which both MNEs realize all of their
projects. In this case, some labor is unemployed, the wage rate is zero and does not
react to changes in the investment level. Optimal access to tax havens is implied
by @W
@
= 0 with
@W
@
=  H 0
Z
d1 + U 0
Z
(   c0) d1  H 0 1c   a d1cda (4.29)
which is positive for large values of 1c   a. The external e¤ect is given by
@W
@
= U 0
Z
(    c0) d1  H 0  1c   a d1cda (4.30)
which becomes negative if 1c   a is large. Thus, in the absence of wage e¤ects,
the underenforcement result applies.
4.4 Extensions
In this subchapter, we briey present the results of the model with slightly modied
assumptions. In 4.4.1, we relax the assumption that the domestic government does
not take into account that foreign wages adapt to its policy changes. In 4.4.2, we
consider the case in which tax payments per project are restricted to be non-
negative.
4.4.1 Large country
If tax competition among large countries instead of small countries is considered,
each government will take into account the wage changes in the other country.
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Equation (4.9) becomes
@W
@
= U 0
Z
(   c0) d1  H 0
Z
d1 + [(1  )U 0    (H 0   U 0)] @w
@
L
 H 0


 
1c   w   a
 d1c
d
+ 
 
2c   w
 d2c
d

(4.31)
In qualitative terms, nothing changes so far but the requirement for  ensuring
that the third term has the same sign as @w
@
which is given by (4.13).
4.4.2 Zero shifting at the margin
If tax payments are bound to be non-negative, it is straight-forward to show that
prot-shifting at the margin equals zero:
 
1c   w   a

(1  )| {z }
0
+ a  c (a)| {z }
0
= 0
The second term on the left hand side can only be zero if a = 0. Assuming
this has implications for scenarios 1 and 3. If a = 0 at the margin, then changes
in  have no e¤ect on wages and tax bases. In both scenarios, the welfare e¤ect
of increasing  is changed to
@W
@
=  H 0
Z
d1 + U 0
Z
(   c0) d1
which is unambiguously negative even if the modied integral borders are taken
into account. In contrast, the e¤ect of foreign tax haven policies on domestic
welfare is given by (4.19), also in scenario 3, and is unambiguously non-negative.
4.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this chapter, we considered optimal enforcement policy in the presence of het-
erogeneous multinational rms. We assumed that these rms di¤er in their access
to tax havens. Depending on the characteristics of the rm which has access to tax
havens, interjurisdictional competition leads to under- or overenforcement. From
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a policy point of view, the results of this chapter suggest that the existence of
prot-shifting alone does not justify the concern of underenforcement. It is rather
important to know which rms engage in prot-shifting and which rms do not.
We showed that it is a crucial aspect of optimal policy consideration whether
there is a correlation between protability and tax haven access. In so far, this
chapter is related to chapter 2 in which results are driven by correlations between
two types of rm-specic characteristics, like mobility and protability.
As in chapter 3, policy has an impact on the quality of investment, i.e. in
response to a policy reform, some kind of investment is increased, some other is
reduced. Whereas in chapter 3, taxation has a positive impact on the quality of
investment in the other country, here, the increase of e¤ective taxes on haven-
using MNEs may have a negative external e¤ect on the other countrys welfare.
The reason is that some of the haven-related projects are shifted abroad and erode
the foreign tax base. The undertaxation result in the preceding chapter is thus
contrasted with the overenforcement result in this chapter.
4.6 Appendix
This appendix derives the e¤ects of policy changes with regard to enforcement on
the labor markets. Therefore, recall that the amount of labor in the domestic and
the foreign country is xed. Z 1+
1c
d1 +
Z 2+
2c
d2 = LZ 1+
1c
d1 +
Z 2+
2c
d2 = L
Di¤erentiating with respect to , w and w gives
@1c
@
+
@1c
@1c
@1c
@

d+

@1c
@w
+
@2c
@w

dw +

@1c
@w
+
@2c
@w

dw = 0
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and
@1c
@
+
@1c
@1c
@1c
@

d+

@1c
@w
+
@2c
@w

dw +

@1c
@w
+
@2c
@w

dw = 0
Replace dw =  

@1c
@
  @
1
c
@1c
@1c
@

d+

@1c
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+
@2c
@w

dw
@1c
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@2c
@w
in the rst di¤erentiated equa-
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In case 4, there are no e¤ects on labor markets since the wage is bound to be
zero.
Chapter 5
Tax e¤ects on multinational rms
In this chapter, we measure the impact of corporate tax reforms in the domestic
country on foreign a¢ liate investment. Using a large panel of European multina-
tionals, we nd a strong and robust negative impact of domestic taxes on foreign
a¢ liate investment. Thus, corporate taxes may have a negative externality on
the foreign countrys tax base. We evaluate this externality against the positive
externality due to prot-shifting and nd that around one third of the latter is
compensated.1
5.1 Introduction
In the public opinion, multinational enterprises (MNE) are considered to be ac-
celerators of the process of globalization. From a scal point of view, MNEs
are supposed to adjust their tax base elastically to corporate tax increases - by re-
allocating either production or prots abroad. To be precise, MNEs are believed to
substitute domestic capital or taxable prots by foreign capital or taxable prots.
But, as recent studies show, foreign investment does not reduce domestic invest-
ment within a multinational rm, it rather boosts it. In technical terms, foreign
and domestic activities are not substitutes, they are complements.
This observation may have important consequences for the thinking about in-
ternational tax issues, some of which are considered in this and the following
1This chapter is based on Becker and Riedel (2007b).
77
78 CHAPTER 5. TAX EFFECTS ON MULTINATIONAL FIRMS
chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to measure the impact of domestic taxa-
tion on foreign capital stocks held by domestic multinational rms. In the presence
of complementarities, the e¤ect may be negative. Using a large rm-level data set,
we show that there is a strong and economically signicant negative e¤ect of do-
mestic taxes on foreign assets. Thus, domestic corporate taxes have a negative
externality through the channel of complementarities within a multinational rm.
This e¤ect obviously runs counter to the well-established positive externality
due to prot-shifting. In simple words, domestic taxes increase foreign tax rev-
enue because reported foreign prots increase due to shifting activities, and they
reduce foreign tax revenue because foreign activity is deterred due to comple-
mentarity e¤ects. We try to quantify the externalities caused by the intra-rm
complementarities and prot-shifting behavior. Here, our results indicate that the
prot-shifting e¤ect dominates. However, the complementarity e¤ect is shown to
compensate a substantial part of the prot-shifting externality on foreign a¢ liates
pre-tax prots (around 30%).
In the context of the preceding chapters, it is heterogeneity in ownership which
is in the center focus of this chapter. Our presumption is that two otherwise
identical a¢ liates may behave di¤erently because the one is owned by a parent
company in a high-tax country and the other is held by some owner in the low-tax
country.
Observable complementarity in activities may have di¤erent reasons. At least,
three stories can be told. Firstly, and perhaps most plausibly, there may be com-
plementarities in production, i.e. technological reasons for the observed empirical
pattern in investment. If the a¢ liate produces some input necessary for the pro-
duction of output at the headquarter, the two levels of activity are complements
rather than substitutes. If the headquarter invests in technology, which can also
be used in the a¢ liate, in the brand name or in research and development, then
activities are complements, too.
Secondly, a purely tax-driven type of complementarity occurs in the following
setting. If the cost of prot-shifting negatively depends on the size of the capital
stock, prot-shifting lowers the cost of capital, as has been discussed in chapter 4.
In this case, the opportunity of shifting inates both capital stocks, in the domestic
and the foreign country. If the foreign country increases its tax rate, prot-shifting
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is reduced, the avoidance-adjusted cost of capital(Grubert and Slemrod (1998))
is increased and both capital stocks are reduced. The opposite is true, though, if
the high-tax country increases its tax rate.
Thirdly, if multinational rms are liquidity- or credit-constraint, then corporate
tax cuts (increases) will have an income e¤ect on investment in both locations.
If the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect due to modied relative
locational costs of capital, an observable complementarity will occur.
The available evidence so far does not deal with tax reforms, so we can be quite
sure that the observable complementarity is not entirely due to prot-shifting
e¤ects. Moreover, one can doubt whether multinational rms are substantially
credit-constraint which concerns the plausibility of the third story. Under these
considerations, we will derive the hypotheses in a model with production extern-
alities. In the empirical subchapter, we will ask for the empirically observable
relationship between foreign and domestic investment in response to tax reforms
without putting too much emphasis on the precise channel. In the extensions
subchapter, we will nevertheless consider the prot-shifting story since its built-in
asymmetry allows for some degree of identication against other stories.
The literature on the causal relationship between foreign and domestic invest-
ment starts with Feldstein (1995) who provides evidence using aggregate invest-
ment data and claims that investment abroad reduces domestic investment dollar
for dollar. Desai et al. (2005a) conrm this result with respect to aggregate
values but they also nd that US multinationals increase their domestic capital
stock in response to investment abroad. In Desai et al. (2005b), they use rm-
level data of US multinationals and show that foreign investment in plant, prop-
erty and equipment (PPE) is associated with higher domestic PPE investment.
Similarly, Egger and Pfa¤ermayer (2003) nd that foreign investment increases
domestic investment in tangible assets and does not decrease investment in in-
tangibles. Castellani and Barba Navaretti (2004) and Jaeckle (2006) show that
going abroad increases domestic productivity and competitiveness. Lipsey (1995)
analyzes a cross-section of American multinational rms, reporting a mild positive
correlation between foreign production and domestic employment levels. Stevens
and Lipsey (1992) analyze the investment behavior of seven multinational rms,
concluding that investments in di¤erent locations substitute for each other due
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to costly external nancing. Devereux and Freeman (1995) come to a di¤erent
conclusion in their study of bilateral ows of aggregate investment funds between
seven OECD countries, nding no evidence of tax-induced substitution between
domestic and foreign investment. Desai et al. (2006a) ask whether investment in
tax havens diverts activity from non-havens and nd that non-haven activity rises
in response to tax haven investment activity.
One often discussed issue in this literature is endogeneity: The increase in
foreign and domestic activity may be caused by some unobservable factor like a
new invention, a productivity shock etc. Our approach can be interpreted as one
possible solution for this problem. As tax rate changes can be considered exogenous
from the individual rms point of view, our approach provides additional evidence
for the existence of complementarities within the rm without being exposed to
the same methodological problems as other studies (although there may be and
will be others).
Apart from this, there is extensive evidence that prots are shifted across bor-
ders in response to tax rate di¤erentials (e.g. Hines and Rice (1994) and Clausing
(2003)). Moreover, a large number of studies shows that multinational investment
decreases in the national corporate tax rate (see e.g. Devereux (2007) for a survey).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next subchapter,
two hypotheses are developed and the estimation methodology is set out. Subchapter
5.3 presents the data, gives some descriptive statistics and reports the results. In
subchapter 5.4, we consider several extensions of the analysis. Subchapter 5.5
discusses some implications and concludes.
5.2 Hypotheses and estimation methodology
In this subchapter, we derive two theoretical hypotheses (5.2.1) and outline the
basic estimation methodology to identify the proposed e¤ects (5.2.2).
5.2.1 Hypotheses
Consider the following illustrative model. There are two countries, called the
domestic and the foreign country, in a large world capital market. The domestic
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country hosts the headquarter of a representative MNE, the foreign country the
a¢ liate. The MNE produces output in both locations using capital K as the only
production input. Capital is provided by the world capital market at an interest
rate of r. For the headquarter level, output reads F h
 
Kh

where h denotes the
headquarter. For the a¢ liate level, output is given by F a
 
Kh; Ka

, the superscript
a denotes the a¢ liate. The a¢ liates output depends on the a¢ liates capital stock
and the headquarter endowment with capital.
What is the intuition of this assumption? The a¢ liates output may depend
on the headquarter capital stock if research and development (R&D) is carried out
at the headquarter, and a¢ liate investment becomes more protable and/or pro-
ductive if R&D is successful. Moreover, if an increased headquarter capital stock
increases the quality of the product for which a¢ liate output is a complement,
the protability (i.e. the marginal productivity) of the a¢ liate capital stock is
increased. Alternatively, a third story would consider the a¢ liate as a pure distri-
bution center which has some xed cost but very low marginal cost for distributing
one extra unit of output. If the headquarters capital stock and output increases,
the value of the capital at the subsidiary rises, too.
Thus, the after-tax prots of the MNE is given by
 = F h
 
Kh
  
1  h+ F a  Kh; Ka (1  )  r  Kh +Ka
+
 
h    s  C (s) (5.1)
whereas h and  denote the corporate tax rates at country h and country a
respectively. For simplicity reasons, we assume that capital cost are not deduct-
ible from the corporate tax base which corresponds to full equity nance of the
investment projects.
Moreover, the MNE may shift prots between the headquarter and its a¢ li-
ate. The amount of prots shifted from the headquarter to the a¢ liate is thereby
denoted by s, whereas s > 0 (s < 0) if prots are shifted from the headquarter
to the a¢ liate (from the a¢ liate to the headquarter). To derive an interior solu-
tion, we assume that prot-shifting causes convex concealment cost of C (s) with
@C=@s = sign(h   ) and @2C=@s2 > 0. Optimal prot-shifting activities are
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determined by the rst order condition Cs = h    . Optimal investment implies
Kh : F hh + F
a
h
1  
1  h =
r
1  h (5.2)
Ka : F aa =
r
1   (5.3)
with F hh = @F
h=@Kh, F ah = @F
a=@Kh, F aa = @F
a=@Ka. Equations (5:2) and (5:3)
determine the capital demand functions for Kh and Ka.
As laid out above, we are interested in the corporate tax e¤ects on the own and
foreign capital stock. From equations (5:2) and (5:3) it follows that the marginal
e¤ect of a corporate tax increase at the parent rm on headquarter and subsidiary
investment reads
dKh
dh
=
F aaa
(1  h)F hhhF aaa + (1  ) (F ahhF aaa   F ahaF aah)
 F hh (5.4)
dKa
dh
=   F
a
ah
(1  h)F hhhF aaa + (1  ) (F ahhF aaa   F ahaF aah)
 F hh (5.5)
We assume that F ahhF
a
aa F ahaF aah > 0 holds, which ensures concavity of the pro-
duction function F a in Kh and Ka. Moreover, we presume F aah > 0 which corres-
ponds to a complementary relationship between capital investment at the a¢ liate
and subsidiary level. It follows then directly that dKh=dh < 0, and dKa=dh < 0.
Intuitively, increases in the headquarter tax rate inate the local capital cost and
reduce investment at the headquarter location. If production at the a¢ liate and
headquarter level are complements as suggested by the empirical work cited in the
introduction, the investment reduction at the headquarter location translates in
a drop of investment at the a¢ liate. Note that, in the absence of any interde-
pendencies, i.e. F aah; F
a
ha = 0, tax e¤ects are given by dK
h=dh = r
Fhhh(1 h)
2 and
dKa=dh = 0. Note that expressions (5.4) and (5.5) are derived assuming constant
interest rates.2 Hypothesis 1 directly follows
2It seems that the assumption of constant interest rates is justied in the framework of our
empirical purpose. The sample under consideration mainly consists of MNEs located in European
countries which may be considered small from world capital point of view. However, interest
rate e¤ects will be discussed where necessary.
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Hypothesis 1 Consider the investment at the headquarter and a¢ liate location
to be complements. Then a corporate tax increase at the headquarter location
reduces capital investment at the subsidiary level.
If hypothesis 1 is true, then domestic taxes may have a negative externality on
the foreign countrys tax revenue. This can be illustrated as follows. Let Ti =  iBi,
i 2 fh; ag, denote the tax revenue in the domestic and the foreign country, whereas
Bi describes the local tax base which is given by the representative multinationals
pre-tax prot Bh = F (Kh)   s and Ba = F (Ka; Kh) + s. The e¤ect of the
domestic countrys tax rate increase on the foreign countrys tax revenue is given
by dTa=dh =   dBa=dh with
dBa
dh
=
@F a
@Ka
@Ka
@h
+
@F a
@Kh
@Kh
@h
+
@s
@h
(5.6)
In the absence of these complementarities, the externality caused by corporate tax-
ation would comprise solely the prot-shifting e¤ect @s
@h
> 0. This is the extern-
ality usually associated with national tax policy in the presence of multinational
entities: If the parent company faces a higher tax rate, then prots are shifted to
the a¢ liate country which increases the corporate tax base of the a¢ liate location.
However, in the presence of complementarities in production, @Ka=@h > 0
and @F a=@Kh > 0, the positive prot-shifting externality may be compensated
by a negative externality of the headquarter tax on the a¢ liates capital stock.
A corporate tax increase at the headquarter location does not only induce the
shifting of paper prots to the subsidiary, but additionally reduces headquarter
capital investment that translates into a lower investment level at the subsidiary
location in the presence of intra-rm complementarities. In sum, the externality
of corporate taxation may be positive or negative. In terms of tax competition,
that implies that equilibrium tax rates may be ine¢ ciently low or high. This is
captured by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The positive scal externality due to prot-shifting opportunities
of MNEs is (partially) compensated by the negative scal externality due to
production complementarities.
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It is worth discussing briey how hypothesis 2 relates to the standard literature
on multinational prot-shifting in the presence of tax di¤erentials between coun-
tries. Especially, we could ask if hypothesis 2 implies that studies measuring the
impact of tax di¤erentials on prot-shifting are misled. From our point of view,
the answer is no, because these studies usually choose as dependent variable the
protability of each a¢ liate as reported by the multinational rm, where prot-
ability means the ratio of reported prots over assets. By dividing prots through
assets, this approach abstracts from all e¤ects on assets. We argue that these
studies correctly measure the prot-shifting activity per unit of capital. Estima-
tions of the total amount shifted by multinational rms, though, will be biased if
the complementarity externality is not taken into account. Our results imply that
low-tax countries prot far less than expected from high tax environments in other
countries.
However, as indicated above, production complementarities are not the only
story to explain foreign investment responding negatively to corporate tax in-
creases. At least two alternative stories can be told, prot-shifting e¤ects which
occur in interaction with capital investment and funding restrictions. In what
follows, though, we restrict ourselves to provide evidence that a negative causal
relationship exists.
5.2.2 Estimation methodology
The purpose of the empirical section is to test for the hypotheses derived above.
We rst determine the e¤ect of corporate taxes at the headquarter location on
foreign subsidiariescapital stock. This is captured by the following estimation
equation
log ki;t = 0 + 1  i;t + 2hi;t + 3xi;t + 4xhi;t + i + i;t (5.7)
whereas ki;t denotes the xed assets of a¢ liate i at time t. Since the distribution of
xed assets is rather skewed, we employ the logarithm as endogeneous variable. To
determine the cross e¤ect of headquarter taxes on foreign subsidiariesinvestment,
we include the corporate tax rate at the headquarter location hi;t as explanatory
variable. Additionally, the estimation approach controls for a¢ liate xed e¤ects i
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that capture unobserved time-constant plant-characteristics, and for time-varying
locational and industry characteristics xi;t, as well as time-varying characteristics
of the parent country xhi;t.
The aim of the analysis is to capture the e¤ect of parent country taxes on
subsidiary investment accounting for other possible investment determinants. The
theory predicts that subsidiaries with parents in high-tax countries invest less
than subsidiaries with parents in low-tax countries. Therefore, we expect 2 to
be negative. In some specications, we include country-year xed e¤ects which
fully capture the impact of tax rate and other policy variable changes at the
subsidiarys location. Hence, we are able to implicitly compare capital investment
of subsidiaries in the same country that only di¤er in their parents location and
thus in the parent countrys tax policy. Note that if tax rate changes have e¤ects
on the interest rate, these e¤ects will be equal for all rms and will therefore be
absorbed by the country-year xed e¤ects, too.3
As a robustness test of our analysis, we will rerun the estimations using the
a¢ liates actual tax payments as explanatory variable. Since there might be some
reverse causality concerns with respect to the impact of actual tax payments on
the corporate capital stock, we estimate equation (5:7) employing a rst-di¤erence
approach which follows Arellano and Bond (1991). First-di¤erencing controls for
a¢ liate xed e¤ects, and if there is no serial correlation, the lagged tax payments is
not correlated with the di¤erenced error term and is therefore a valid instrument for
the current tax payments. Lack of serial correlation provides a moment restriction,
so that equation (5:8) can be estimated using the general methods of moments
restriction. In comparison to conventional instrumental variables estimators, this
moment restriction provides additional instruments so that this GMM estimator
is more e¢ cient. To test the validity of these instruments we use a Sargan/Hansen
test (Sargan (1958), Hansen (1982)) of overidentifying restrictions. Because the
model is estimated in rst-di¤erences, the equation will be characterized by the
3Of course, we are also interested in the sign and the size of 1 which measures the e¤ect of the
subsidiarys location tax rate on the subsidiarys asset stock size. Note, though, that we cannot
fully exclude that other unobserved policy changes drive the result in the regressions in which
we include the national corporate tax rate as explanatory variable since the national corporate
rate a¤ects all (protable) corporations in a given country in the same way and hence, a control
groupto the analysis within the same country is missing. However, we address this problem in
an extension section by regressing the capital stock on the actual corporate tax payments.
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presence of rst-order serial correlation. But the validity of the GMM estimator
relies on the absence of second-order serial correlation. The tests for second-order
serial correlation by Arellano and Bond (1991) will be reported at the bottom of
the result tables.4
In a second step, we will quantify the impact of corporate taxes on the multina-
tionals pre-tax prot. If complementarities in asset stocks are accounted for, there
are two e¤ects which compensate each other. Firstly, higher tax rates at the par-
ents location increase the reported prots of the subsidiary due to prot-shifting
activities. Secondly, higher parent location tax rates reduce the subsidiarys stock
of capital and thereby reduces the subsidiarys prots. The estimated equation is
given by
 log bi;t = 1 (hi;t  i;t) + 2 log ki;t + 3xi;t + 4xhi;t +i;t (5.8)
The coe¢ cient 1 measures the impact of the corporate tax rate di¤erence
hi;t  i;t between the headquarter and the a¢ liate country on the reported pre-
tax prots bi;t. In contrast, 2 captures the e¤ect via the asset stock size ki;t which
may be a¤ected by the parent tax rate; xi;t and xhi;t are control variables as dened
above.
In contrast to the prot-shifting channel, the impact of the rms assets on
prots may be mismeasured due to reverse causality problems: high prots may
equally trigger high capital investment. Therefore, we estimate the e¤ect of an
asset increase on prots by employing the rst-di¤erence approach by Arellano
and Bond (1991) shortly described above. Note, that  denotes the rst di¤erence
of a variable. First-di¤erencing controls for a¢ liate xed e¤ects, and if there is no
serial correlation, lagged xed assets are not correlated with the di¤erenced error
term and are therefore valid instruments for the current xed assets. Following
equation (5:7) we additionally include the corporate tax rates at the a¢ liate and
parent location as instruments for a¢ liate xed assets. To test the validity of these
instruments we again use a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.5
4We choose the lags of the instruments on the basis of the serial correlation test and the
Sargan Hansen test.
5Note moreover, that the standard errors of the GMM model presented in the Result Section
are robust one-step errors. Simulation studies have shown that the e¢ ciency gain from using the
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5.3 Data, descriptive statistics and results
In this subchapter, we describe the data base (5.3.1), give some descriptive statist-
ics (5.3.2) and report the result of the estimation approach outlined above (5.3.3).
5.3.1 Data set
Our empirical analysis relies on the AMADEUS data base which is compiled by
Bureau van Dijck and contains detailed accounting and rm structure information
for 1.6 million corporations in 38 countries. The data is available from 1995 to
2005, but unbalanced in structure. Since our analysis centers around corporate
tax e¤ects on multinational rms, we restrict our sample to subsidiaries which are
directly and ultimately owned by a foreign parent company.6 Additionally, for
an a¢ liate to be included in the data set it has to be ultimately owned by an
industrial corporation and has to employ more than 10 workers (see for example
Barba Navaretti, Checchi and Turrini (2003)).
Apart from this, we include companies based on the availability of the essential
information needed for our analysis (xed assets, corporate tax rate at a¢ liate
and parent location). Additionally, a¢ liate observations will only be used in the
regressions if the link to the global ultimate owner as well as basic information on
this parent corporation is available with AMADEUS. Last, we have to restrict the
sample to corporate groups with unconsolidated accounting information.
The ownership information in our data refers to the last reported date which
is the year 2005 for most corporations in our data set. Thus, ownership has a
cross sectional dimension only. In line with previous work based on the same
data, we are not too concerned about this assumption. To the extent that we are
potentially including a few a¢ liates which were not a¢ liated in earlier years, we
are introducing a measurement error that biases our results towards zero (Budd,
Konings and Slaughter (2005), Barba Navaretti et al. (2003)).
two-step procedure is very modest even in the presence of considerable heteroscedasticity, see
Arellano and Bond (1991).
6The AMADEUS data contains information on a corporations direct investment in other
rms. For a corporation to be identied as parent company, it has to own 100% of the subsidiary
directly and ultimately.
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Matching parent companies to foreign a¢ liates gives an unbalanced panel with
5429 a¢ liates and 2049 parent corporations over 10 years. Table 5-1 exhibits the
country distribution which is basically consistent with patterns of multinational
rms in Europe. Most of the global ultimate owners are concentrated in Western
European countries like France, Germany and Belgium. In contrast, many subsi-
diaries are located in the European South (Spain and Italy) as well as in new EU
member states like the Czech Republic and Poland.
Table 5.1: Country Statistic
Affiliate Parent Affiliate Parent
Austria 61 42 Hungary 104 2
Belgium 416 146 Ireland 208 58
Cyprus 0 2 Italy 379 144
Czech Republic 181 0 Lithuania 26 2
Germany 292 311 Luxembourg 27 28
Denmark 232 136 Latvia 39 1
Estonia 91 6 Netherlands 352 219
Spain 785 82 Poland 302 6
Finland 196 79 Portugal 78 17
France 730 209 Sweden 306 233
United Kingdom 834 317 Slovenia 2 2
Greece 49 4 Slovakia 39 0
Sum 5,429 2,049
Since our analysis investigates corporate tax e¤ects on capital investment and
pre-tax prot, we merge the rm data with data on the statutory corporate tax
rates for EU 25 countries as well as other country characteristics like GDP per
capita, GDP growth rate, the population size and an earnings index for the manu-
facturing industry. The corporate tax rates are thereby taken from the Commission
(2006), while the information on GDP per capita and population size is obtained
from the OECD webpage.
5.3.2 Sample statistics
The data contains 34237 a¢ liate-year observations. Thus, the accounting inform-
ation is available for 6:3 years on average. Table 5-2 summarizes basic sample
statistics.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Number ofObservations Mean
Standard
Deviation
Affiliate
Fixed Assets 34,237 36,254.54 428470.5
Employment 25,433 250.33 857.16
Profit Loss Before Tax 32,299 3,400.60 54808.74
Statutory Tax Rate 34,237 0.3300 0.071
Average Tax Payment 21,343 0.0379 0.0459
GDP per Capita 31,386 24,396.27 5763.54
Parent Company
Statutory Tax Rate 34,237 0.3515 0.0777
Average Tax Payment 10,392 0.0180 0.0245
GDP per Capita 32,143 27,022.56 4737.58
The average amount of xed assets at the a¢ liate level is measured to be 36mil-
lion US Dollar. Moreover, the average employment level amounts to 250 employees
while the corporations earn a pre-tax prot of 3 million US dollar on average. The
average corporate tax rate at the parent location is measured with 0:35 and is,
hence, slightly higher than the corporate tax rate at the a¢ liate location which
is 0:33. This observation is in line with the common perception that headquar-
ters are mainly located in western European high-tax countries while production
also takes place through a¢ liates in Eastern and Southern European countries
with lower corporate tax rates. Additionally, we will run sensitivity checks on
our regressions using the actual corporate tax payments instead of the national
tax rate as explanatory variable. We calculate this measure by dividing actual
corporate tax payments by corporate total asset. Total assets are used because
this information is available for more parent corporations than pre-tax prots or
xed assets and hence, we hedge us against loosing too many observations. The
average tax payment per total assets amounts to 0:04 at the a¢ liate level and
0:02 at the headquarter location. Interestingly, (assuming equal productivity) the
headquarter thus carries a lower tax burden than the subsidiaries.
5.3.3 Estimation results
Our central aim is to determine the e¤ect of the corporate tax rate at the a¢ l-
iate and parent level on the volume of a¢ liates xed assets. In a second step,
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we will determine the corporate tax e¤ect on pre-tax prots distinguishing the
complementarity e¤ect from the prot-shifting e¤ect.
Table 5-3 contains xed-e¤ect estimations of the corporate xed assets on the
statutory corporate tax rate at the a¢ liate and parent location. In specication
(1), we include a full set of year and a¢ liate dummies to control for time-constant
a¢ liate characteristics and shocks common to all a¢ liates over time. We nd a sig-
nicantly negative e¤ect of both, the domestic and the foreign statutory tax rate,
on xed assets. The semi-elasticities are calculated with  0:6903 and  0:3874
respectively. Specication (2) reestimates the relationship including a set of vari-
ables controlling for time-varying country characteristics at the a¢ liate and parent
location. We account for GDP per capita, population size, the growth rate of GDP
per capita and earnings in the manufacturing industry. Multinational rms tend
to locate high investment levels in countries with high populations, while a large
population at the parent country deters investment. This is in line with the basic
proximity concentration trade-o¤ known from trade-theory models. The service of
large markets via exports is associated with high transport costs. That increases
the attractiveness of FDI compared to exports. Moreover, a high GDP growth
and high earnings in manufacturing tend to increase multinational capital invest-
ment, whereas we nd also weak evidence that high levels of these controls in the
parent country tend to increase the xed asset stock at the a¢ liate.7 Although
GDP per capita at the a¢ liate exhibits an unexpected negative sign, this can be
explained by the additional inclusion of earnings in the manufacturing index as a
proxy for the (change) in national income as well. Without the inclusion of manu-
facturing earnings, GDP per capita captures the positive income e¤ect on capital
investment.
7All control variables despite the GDP growth rate enter the estimation equation in log form.
This specication is chosen since it seems to t the data slightly better than an inclusion in
levels. Note, however, that the estimated corporate tax coe¢ cient are neither qualitatively nor
quantitatively sensitive to the specication of the controls.
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Table 5.3: Fixed Effect Estimation, End. Variable: Log Fixed Assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Statutory Tax Rate, Affiliate -0.6903*** -1.1138*** -1.1496*** -0.7971***
0.2024 (0.2334) (0.2371) (0.2527)
Statutory Tax Rate, Parent -0.3874** -0.6337** -0.6383*** -0.6245*** -0.4632***
(0.1615) (0.2074) (0.2090) (0.2112) (0.2142)
GDP per Capita, Affiliate -0.6094** -0.6521** -1.4252***
(0.2812) (0.2841) (0.3455)
GDP per Capita, Parent 0.5287* 0.6528*** 0.5186 0.3665
(0.3252) (0.3277) (0.3290) (0.3363)
Population, Affiliate 4.9737*** 4.9246*** 7.8969***
(0.7787) (0.7862) (0.8642)
Population, Parent -0.5319*** -1.3602 -1.0686 -0.9196
(1.0742) (1.0800) (1.1018) (1.1343)
GDP Growth, Affiliate 1.8278*** 1.7136*** 1.3708***
(0.4093) (0.4132) (0.4394)
GDP Growth, Parent 0.6063 0.3852 0.4059 0.4547
(0.4515) (0.4549) (0.4553) (0.4663)
Earnings Manufacturing, Affiliate 1.2860*** 1.3755*** 1.1449*** -0.2531
(0.1197) (0.1203) (0.2635) (0.9952)
Earnings Manufacturing, Parent 0.6063 0.2640 0.4615 0.6195
(0.4515) (0.3727) (0.3982) (0.4053)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year-Industry Dummies yes yes yes
Year-Eastern Europe Dummies yes yes
Year-Country Dummies yes
Number of Observations 34237 29928 29292 29292 29292
Number of Firms 5429 5157 5043 5043 5043
R-squared 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
The inclusion of the additional country controls substantially increases the es-
timated coe¢ cients for the statutory tax at the a¢ liate as well as at the parent
country. Specications (3) and (4) additionally include a set of industry year
dummies and a set of year-Eastern Europe dummies accounting for possible dif-
ferences in shocks to Western and Eastern Europe over time. Industry is thereby
specied at the NACE 1-digit level. The estimated taxation coe¢ cients are ro-
bust to these inclusions and remain large and statistically signicant. The semi-
elasticities estimated in specication (4) are  0:6903 for the tax at the a¢ liate
country and  0:3874 for the tax at the parent country. Last, in specication
(5) we add country-year e¤ects which absorb all country-specic shocks to the
subsidiary and also capture the corporate tax e¤ect on local investment (hence,
there is no coe¢ cient estimate reported for this e¤ect). For this specication, the
estimated coe¢ cient slightly drops in size but remains statistically signicant at
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the 1% level. In Table 5-4, we re-estimate the model including the corporate tax
e¤ects in log-form. The coe¢ cient estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar to the results for the semi-logarithmic form. Controlling for country-year
e¤ects, specication (5) suggests that a 10% increase in the parent tax rate reduces
investment at the a¢ liate level by 1:9%.
Table 5.4: Fixed Effect Estimation, End. Variable: Log Fixed Assets
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Statutory Tax Rate, Affiliate -0.3735*** -0.5038*** -0.5048*** -0.3740***
0.0670 (0.0799) (0.0807) (0.0906)
Log Statutory Tax Rate, Parent -0.1348** -0.2688*** -0.2702*** -0.2592*** -0.1885**
(0.0689) (0.0907) (0.0913) (0.0925) (0.0939)
GDP per Capita, Affiliate -0.6564** -0.7067*** -1.3880***
(0.2764) (0.2794) (0.3415)
GDP per Capita, Parent 0.5090 0.6307** 0.5020 0.3389
(0.3238) (0.3263) (0.3277) (0.3351)
Population, Affiliate 4.9737*** 5.5568*** 8.1747***
(0.7787) (0.8016) (0.8703)
Population, Parent -0.4695 -1.2842 -1.0341 -0.8262
(1.0758) (1.0817) (1.1028) (1.1352)
GDP Growth, Affiliate 1.7605*** 1.6497*** 1.3582***
(0.4096) (0.4134) (0.4394)
GDP Growth, Parent 0.5891 0.3718 0.4047 0.4690
(0.4511) (0.4545) (0.4551) (0.4660)
Earnings Manufacturing, Affiliate 1.286*** 1.3611*** 1.1477*** 0.6120
(0.1196) (0.1201) (0.2633) (0.4082)
Earnings Manufacturing, Parent 0.2228 0.2892 0.4713 0.6195
(0.3719) (0.3744) (0.4005) (0.4053)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Year-Industry Dummies yes yes yes
Year-Eastern Europe Dummies yes yes
Year-Country Dummies yes
Number of Observations 34237 29928 29292 29292 29292
Number of Firms 5429 5157 5043 5043 5043
R-squared 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Thus, we can conclude that there is quite robust evidence for a negative and
signicant impact of home country taxes on host country activity. This generates
a potentially important externality of domestic tax policy on the foreign countrys
tax revenue. Therefore, this nding may have implications for tax e¢ ciency in
the presence of multinational corporations and is thus related to another hotly
debated question: ine¢ ciencies caused by cross-border prot-shifting. It is straight-
forward to ask how these two externalities are related to each other. While tax
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rate increases exert a positive externality on the other countrys tax revenue via
the prot-shifting channel, complementarities generate a negative externality. Our
aim is to quantitatively weigh these two e¤ects against each other.
Therefore, we investigate the causal e¤ect of domestic and foreign corporate
taxes on corporate pre-tax prot, thereby di¤erentiating the prot-shifting and the
complementarity e¤ect. One unique feature of prot-shifting activity is that the
shifting volume is determined by the tax di¤erential dened as domestic statutory
corporate tax rate minus parent statutory corporate tax rate. Thus, we can capture
the prot-shifting e¤ect by including the tax rate di¤erential in the estimation
equation for corporate pre-tax prot. In contrast, the complementarity e¤ect is
driven by the impact of foreign corporate taxes on domestic input factor choice
which in turn a¤ects domestic corporate pre-tax prot. Hence, we include xed
assets in the estimation equation. Following our analysis so far we estimate a
GMM model where we instrument for xed assets using the domestic and foreign
statutory corporate tax rates. Moreover the third to fth lag of the xed assets
variable are included among others to instrument for the change in xed assets.8
Table 5-5 presents several model specications. Specication (1) controls for
GDP per capita and population at the a¢ liate and parent country and year dum-
mies. The tax rate di¤erential enters with a negative sign, as expected, the semi-
elasticity is estimated with  0:7189. Thus, a larger di¤erence between the stat-
utory tax rate at the a¢ liate level and statutory taxes at the parent location
reduces the MNEs pre-tax prot. This observation is in line with prot-shifting
behavior. The coe¢ cient estimate on xed assets indicates that a 1% increase in
xed assets raises pre-tax prots by 0:42% on average. The following estimations
(2) to (4) additionally control for industry-year dummies and the GDP growth
rate as well as the earnings in manufacturing. Especially, the inclusion of the ad-
ditional country control variables lead to a slight drop in the absolute size of both
coe¢ cients, the estimated coe¢ cient for the xed asset investment as well as the
coe¢ cient for the di¤erence in statutory tax rates.
8The lags of instruments are chosen based on the test of second order autocorrelation and the
Sargan/Hansen test.
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Table 5.5: Endogeneous Variable: Log Profit Before Tax
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Profit/Loss Before Tax, Lag1 0.1934*** 0.2299*** 0.1742*** 0.2207***
 (0.0688)  (0.0712)  (0.0707)  (0.0740)
Tax Rate Differential -0.7189** -0.6455* -0.7316** -0.6688*
 (0.3434)  (0.3648)  (0.3542)  (0.3786)
Log Fixed Assets 0.4178*** 0.3342** 0.3912*** 0.3015**
 (0.1419)  (0.1490)  (0.1432)  (0.1503)
GDP per Capita, Affiliate 1.6901*** -2.2670 0.958 -2.1576
 (0.3063)  (2.3276)  (0.6059)  (2.4166)
GDP per Capita, Parent -0.6320*  2.7974  0.6471  3.3277
 (0.3316)  (2.1964)  (0.7331)  (2.2538)
Population, Affiliate -3.1975*  1.5058 -3.2930*  1.2461
 (1.7875)  (3.8639)  (1.7913)  (3.9950)
Population, Parent -0.5169 -0.0857 -0.1864 -0.11278
 (2.8615)  4.9902  (2.8514)  (5.1257)
GDP per Capita Growth, Affiliate 3.9304* 4.0450*
 (2.1527)  (2.2173)
GDP per Capita Growth, Parent -2.6185 -3.3005
 (2.5160)  (2.5985)
Earnings, Affiliate  1.8665  1.4639
 (2.4429)  (2.5916)
Earnings, Parent -2.9354 -3.7479
 3.3751  (3.4695)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Year-Industry Dummies yes yes
Number of Observations 10785 10513 10593 10321
Number of Firms 2935 2895 2874 2834
Test for 2nd Order Autocorrelation (z-Value)  0.608  0.886  0.349  0.641
Sargan Test (p-Value)  0.253  0.469  0.228  0.513
5.4 Extensions
5.4.1 E¤ective corporate tax rates
Our results in the previous subchapter provide evidence that the statutory corpor-
ate tax rate at the headquarter location exerts a negative impact on investment
at the a¢ liate level. Although our theory section does not distinguish between
the statutory corporate tax and the e¤ective corporate tax rate, it is obvious that
the complementarity e¤ect hinges on the e¤ective corporate tax rate for which
the statutory rate was used as a proxy above. As a sensitivity check we therefore
reestimate the causal impact of headquarterstaxes on a¢ liate employment using
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the actual corporate tax payment per unit of total assets at the headquarters
location as explanatory variable. Since the inclusion of actual corporate tax pay-
ment in the capital investment equation may be prone to endogeneity problems, we
again employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) approach estimating a rst-di¤erenced
equation with lagged corporate taxation levels as instruments for the change in tax
payment. The results can be found in Table 5-6. The rst equation controls for
time xed e¤ects while the second specication additionally includes industry-year
dummies.9 Both estimations provide evidence in line with our results and indicate
that an increase in the corporate tax burden at the headquarter location translates
in signicantly lower investment levels at the a¢ liates.
Table 5.6: Endogeneous Variable: Log Fixed Assets
Variable (1) (2)
Log Fixed Assets, Lag1 0.4003*** 0.3448***
(0.1015) (0.0975)
Log Average Tax Payment, Affiliate -0.0681*** -0.0660***
(0.0217) (0.0212)
Log Average Tax Payment, Parent -0.0301** -0.03450**
(0.0154) (0.0162)
Year Dummies yes yes
Year-Industry Dummies yes
 Number of Observations  3252  3208
 Number of Firms  1157  1140
 Test for Second Order Autocorrelation (z-Value)  0.75  0.74
 Sargan Test (p-Value)  0.20  0.36
5.4.2 Investment e¤ects of prot-shifting
Our simple model presented in the theory section abstracted from corporate tax
e¤ects on multinational capital investment that is driven by prot-shifting consid-
erations. In the preceding subchapter, we measured the impact of domestic tax
reforms on related a¢ liates in the foreign country without specifying the precise
channel through which tax changes translate into investment e¤ects. As already
indicated in the introduction, the prot-shifting story yields asymmetric e¤ects
depending on where, in the low-tax country or in the high-tax country, the tax
change takes place. Part of the literature suggests that prot-shifting is facilitated
9Both specications employ the second lag of e¤ective average tax payments as instruments.
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with increasing size of corporate investment at the a¢ liate location. This reects
the notion that enlarged investment activity corresponds to an increased intra-
rm trade connection between the a¢ liates which makes it easier to shift prots
between the locations (see e.g. Grubert and Slemrod (1998), who introduce the
term of avoidance-adjusted cost of capital). The modeling strategy would for
example presume that prots can be shifted per unit of capital at the a¢ liate
location and hence multinational after-tax prots could be summarized as
 = F h
 
Kh
  
1  h+ F a  Kh; Ka (1  )  r  Kh +Ka
+
 
h    s  C (s)Ka (5.9)
Thus, optimal investment at the a¢ liate location is given by
F aa =
r   (h   )s  C
1   (5.10)
It holds that (h   )s   C > 0 since the multinational would otherwise not
engage in paper prot-shifting. This implies that positive prot-shifting activities
lead to increased investment at the a¢ liate level whereas the investment is higher
the larger the amount shifted. Assuming shifting costs to be constant across
multinational rms located in di¤erent countries, prot-shifting activity increases
in the gross shifting gains which are given by the absolute tax rate di¤erence
between two locations. Therefore, the theoretical extension would predict that the
a¢ liate capital stock raises in the absolute tax di¤erence to the home country.
Calculating the e¤ect of headquarter taxes on the a¢ liatescapital investment
gives
dKa
dh
=   F
a
ah
(1  h)F hhhF aaa + (1  ) (F ahhF aaa   F ahaF aah)
 F hh
 
 
1  hF hhh + (1  )F ahh
(1  h)F hhhF aaa + (1  ) (F ahhF aaa   F ahaF aah)
 s
1  t (5.11)
The rst term on the right hand side corresponds to equation (5:4). The
second term reects the impact of prot-shifting on investment behavior. For a
better understanding, assume for the moment that there are no complementarities,
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F aah = F
a
ha = 0. The expression then becomes:
dKa
dh
=   1
F aaa
 s
1  t (5.12)
It is obvious that the e¤ect of the parent locations tax rate carries the same
sign as the prot-shifting term s. If the parent locations tax rate is lower than
the subsidiary locations, h <  , then increasing h leads to an decrease in the
subsidiarys stock of capital. The intuition for the result is very simple. An increase
in h leads to an decrease in the tax di¤erential between parent and subsidiary rm.
This reduces the incentive to shift prots and to decrease the avoidance-adjusted
cost of capital by enlarging the subsidiarys stock of capital.
To test for these capital e¤ects, we include the absolute tax rate di¤erential
between the headquarter and the corporate subsidiary in the xed e¤ect estimation
described by equation 5:7. The results are presented in Table 5-7. In line with the
theoretical prediction, the absolute tax rate di¤erence exerts a signicantly positive
impact on a¢ liate investment and is robust against the inclusion of industry-year
and country-year dummies. The estimated coe¢ cient for the absolute corporate
tax rate di¤erence in specication (3) presents a semi-elasticity of 0:4567.
The size of the e¤ects of headquarters taxes on a¢ liate investment thus de-
pends on the relation of corporate taxes. If the headquarters tax falls short from
the tax rate at the a¢ liate location, the complementarity and prot-shifting in-
vestment e¤ect point in the same direction. Increases in the corporate tax rate at
the headquarter location lead to a substantial drop in a¢ liatesassets. In turn, if
the headquarters tax exceeds the corporate tax at the a¢ liate location, then an in-
crease in the headquarter tax reduces a¢ liate investment through the complement-
arity e¤ect but may, however, increase corporate investment due to prot-shifting
induced considerations. According to specication (3) in Table 5-7, we nd that
the e¤ect of corporate taxes at the parent location on xed assets at the a¢ liate
is represented by a semi-elasticity of  1:2278 (=  0:7711   0:4567) if h <  .
In turn, if the headquarter country is the high-tax country and h >  holds,
then the complementarity investment e¤ect and the prot-shifting investment ef-
fect point in di¤erent directions. This translates in an estimated semi-elasticity of
 0:3144 (=  0:7711+0:4567). This implies that if (equilibrium) tax rates feature
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h <  , then the described investment e¤ects dampen the prot-shifting e¤ect by
55% (0:6688   0:3015  1:2278 = 0:2986). In contrast, if (equilibrium) tax rates
feature h >  then the share of the prot-shifting e¤ect amounts to 14% only
(0:6688  0:3015  0:3144 = 0:5740).
Table 5.7: Fixed Effect Estimation, End. Variable: log Fixed Assets
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Statutory Tax Rate, Affiliate -1.2092*** -1.2392***
(0.2351) (0.2385)
Statutory Tax Rate, Parent -1.1219*** -1.1525*** -0.7711***
(0.2537) (0.2577) (0.2899)
Absolute Difference Statutory Taxes 0.6744*** 0.7014*** 0.4567*
(0.2018) (0.2051) (0.2589)
GDP per Capita, Affiliate -0.6789** -0.7273***
(0.2819) (0.2848)
GDP per Capita, Parent 0.5442* 0.6668** 0.3968
(0.3252) (0.3277) (0.3360)
Population, Affiliate 5.1771*** 5.1261***
(0.7809) (0.7882)
Population Parent -0.6534 -0.7002
(1.0746) (1.1141)
Earnings Manufacturing, Affiliate 1.2835*** 1.3562***
(0.1200) (0.1204)
Earnings, Manufacturing, Parent 0.2742 0.3484 0.4738
(0.3710) (0.3734) (0.3792)
Growth Rate Per Capita, Affiliate 1.8295*** 1.7149***
(0.4093) (0.4131)
Growth Rate Per Capita, Parent 0.6037 0.3854 0.4394
(0.4514) (0.4548) (0.4656)
Year Dummies yes yes yes
Year-Industry Dummies yes yes
Year-Country Dummies yes
Number of Observations 29, 928 29, 292 29, 292
Number of Firms 5, 157 5, 043 5, 043
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91
In this context it is interesting to note that in our sample 52% of the a¢ liates
have their direct parent corporation in a country with a higher statutory corporate
tax rate while 48% are owned by parent corporations that pay a lower statutory
tax rate on average.
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5.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this chapter, we used a large rm-level data set to test for tax policy e¤ects
in the presence of complementarities within multinational enterprises. Our results
show that tax increases at the domestic parent location negatively a¤ect the foreign
subsidiarys stock of capital. Consequently, domestic tax policy imposes a negative
externality on the foreign countrys tax revenue. In a second step we quantied this
externality and contrasted it with the well-established positive externality due to
prot-shifting. We found that the shifting externality is considerably compensated
by up to 34%. We concluded that low-tax countries do not prot as much from
tax rate increases in high-tax countries than is usually assumed.
Our results may change the perspective from which multinational enterprises
are considered. An often cited view is that multinational rms, as opposed to
nationally operating rms, accelerate tax competition. Our analysis shows that
multinational rms export the tax burden on the headquarter to its a¢ liates.
That means, if real economic activity and not accounting prots are concerned, the
existence of multinational rms may dampen the pressure from tax competition.
This question is analyzed in the next chapter. Whereas this chapter has focused on
heterogeneity in ownership, the next chapter will be centered around the di¤erence
between multinational rms and national rms.
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Chapter 6
Multinationals and tax
competition
If domestic taxes reduce foreign a¢ liate investment, as shown in the previous
chapter, the standard model of tax competition may be misspecied. In this chapter,
we build a tax competition model where domestic and foreign production are com-
plements. It is shown that, in the presence of complementarities, domestic taxes
c.p. exert a negative e¤ect on the foreign a¢ liate capital stock. But, the positive
externality via the world capital market (taking the form of lower interest rates)
always dominates the negative externality due to complementarities. However,
equilibrium tax rates under tax competition increase in the share of multination-
als which runs counter to the intuition expressed in the public debate and some
scholarly work.1
6.1 Introduction
As we have shown in the preceding chapter, and as is conrmed by a number of
other papers, foreign investment does not reduce domestic investment within a
multinational group, it rather increases it. However, if the world capital supply
is not perfectly elastic, an increase of the multinationals investment level has to
result in a decrease of investment in some other rm. Potential candidates are
1This chapter is based on Becker and Riedel (2007a).
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multinational rms in other countries or purely nationally operating rms. The
purpose of this chapter is to ask how tax e¤ects look like in a world where domestic
and foreign investments are complements within a multinational group. We build a
model in which capital is transferred across borders through two distinct channels:
via the world capital market and via multinational rms. Taxes may distort the
use of these channels, and complementarities in international investment projects
may change the results derived in the standard tax competition framework. This
concerns the underprovision of public goods in the competitive equilibrium and
the scope for welfare enhancing coordination policies.
There are only a few papers which are concerned with complementarity (or
substitutability) of production technology within multinational groups. Grubert
and Mutti (1995) analyze a multinational rm with R&D activity resulting in a
rm-wide productivity gain. Nielsen, Raimondos-Møller and Schjelderup (2004)
show that production in the multinational rms a¢ liate and headquarter can be
complementary in the presence of a rm-wide public good (e.g. a brand, patent,
etc.). They build a model in which taxes have negative scal externalities and
suggest that complementary production structures may give rise to overtaxation.
Furthermore, this chapter refers to the standard tax competition model as es-
tablished in the seminal papers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson
(1986).2
Our theoretical results show that international tax rate di¤erentials distort the
sizes of the multinational and the national rm sectors. Surprisingly, in the pres-
ence of complementarities within a rm group, higher taxes lead to an excessive
size of the multinational sector. Moreover, we nd a negative scal externality of
domestic corporate taxation on the tax revenue of the foreign country due to the
existence of multinational rms. We ask whether this externality results in overtax-
ation of business prots, but nd that this negative externality is unambiguously
dominated by the positive externality which causes underprovision of public goods
and which is well-known from the standard tax competition literature.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next subchapter,
the model and the main results are presented. Subchapter 6.3 presents some
extensions. Subchapter 6.4 discusses the implications of the results and concludes.
2The theoretical literature is surveyed by Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Fuest et al. (2005).
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6.2 The model
This subchapter starts with a model of a rm group, consisting of a headquarter
and an a¢ liate. We derive tax e¤ects depending on the status of the rm, i.e.
whether it is a purely national or a multinational rm. Then, we build a two-
country model with uncoordinated tax policies and analyze the welfare implica-
tions of complementarities in the rmsproduction technology. We consider tax
coordination policies and derive its welfare e¤ects.
6.2.1 A model of the (multinational) rm
Consider a rm with two sites of production which will be called the headquarter
(H) and the a¢ liate (A). If both production sites are located in the same juris-
diction, the rm will be called purely national rm(PNE). In contrast, the rm
will be called multinational rm(MNE), if the two sites are located in distinct
jurisdictions. Assume that there is no decision to become an MNE or not3 and
that production technology does not depend on the status (MNE or PNE) of the
rm.4
The rm produces one good with some decreasing returns to scale technology
which gives rise to pure prots. Production takes place in both sites. It is the focus
of our interest how production in one location relates to production in the other
location. The simplest case is that both sites are perfectly independent of each
other, i.e. the whole production chain is established in both sites. In this case,
the two sites act as if they were non-related rms with the only di¤erence being
that they have the same owner. We also allow for specialization among production
sites on di¤erent parts of the production chain, i.e. the activity of the a¢ liate may
depend on the activity in the headquarter, and vice versa.
All these cases (independency, complementarity, substitutability) are accounted
3See Bucovetsky and Hauer (forthcoming) for an analysis of tax e¤ect on the organizational
decision.
4As the recent literature on heterogeneous rms shows, and as has been discussed in the in-
troductory chapter, MNEs do di¤er considerably from PNEs in terms of technology, protability
and other characteristics. Assuming identical technology in both types of rms has the purpose
to isolate those e¤ects which are purely due to the status of being a multinational rm compared
to producing in just one country.
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for by assuming a production technology of F
 
KH ; KA

, where KH is the capital
stock at the head quarter and KA is the capital stock at the a¢ liate production
site.5 In the absence of taxes, corporate prots are given by  = F
 
KH ; KA
  
r
 
KH +KA

, where r is the interest rate determined on the world capital market.
Optimal capital input is given by FH = FA = r, where FH = @F
@KH
, FA = @F
@KA
.
Now, taxes are introduced. We consider taxes on capital returns levied at the
rm-level and not on prots, for presentational reasons which are discussed in the
extensions subchapter. We rule out other nancing sources than equity. Thus, the
after-tax income of the rm is given by
 = F
 
KH ; KA
  r  1 + HKH   r  1 + AKA (6.1)
Optimal capital inputs are given by FH = r
 
1 + H

and FA = r
 
1 + A

.
How does the capital stock react to tax rate changes? Di¤erentiating both equa-
tions with respect to KH , KA and H gives us
dKH
dH
= 
 1FAAr and
dKH
dA
= 
 1FHAr (6.2)
dKA
dA
= 
 1FHHr and
dKA
dH
= 
 1FAHr (6.3)
with 
 = FHHFAA FHAFAH > 0, by assumption6, and FAA = @2F
@(KA)2
, FHA =
@2F
@KH@KA
etc. If the two production sites are not linked at all, FAH ; FHA = 0, then
taxes have the standard e¤ects: dK
H
dH
= r
FHH
< 0 and dK
A
dA
= r
FAA
< 0. Then,
with a given interest rate, taxes at the a¢ liate do not inuence the headquarter
capital stock, dK
H
dA
= 0, and vice versa, dK
A
dH
= 0. However, if production in
the two locations is complementary, FAH ; FHA > 0, a¢ liate taxes decrease the
headquarter capital stock, and vice versa. A¢ liate taxes increase the headquarter
capital stock if the two capital stocks are substitutes.
5An example for complementary production is the following explicit production function
F =
 
KH
  
KA
1 
: FH = 

KA
KH
1 
, FHA =  (1  )   1
KH
1    1
KA

> 0. An ex-
ample for substitutability is given by F =
 
KH +KA

: FH = 
 
KH +KA
 1
, FHA =
  (1  )  KH +KA 2 < 0.
6
 > 0 is implied by the concavity assumption of the production technology; it ensures the
existence of a prot maximum.
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In the following, we will analyze rm group behaviour and tax e¤ects in a
two-country model with a closed capital market. There will be two types of rms,
PNEs and MNEs. In fact, the only di¤erence between these two types of rms
which we are interested in is that, for the domestic PNE, H = A =  where 
is the domestic tax rate, whereas H =  and A =   for the domestic MNE,
where   is the foreign tax rate. Our main interest is whether the existence of
complementarity (or substitutability) in the production technology changes the
main results of the standard tax competition model.
6.2.2 A two country model with two types of rms
There are two investment locations, the domestic and the foreign country. In
both countries there is a representative household owning a xed capital stock.
The stock is rented by the representative investor at a rental price of r which
is endogenously determined at the world capital market. Capital K is the only
production input.
In both countries there are many identical rms which only di¤er in the location
of their a¢ liates. The purely national rms (PNE) have both the headquarter and
the a¢ liate in either the domestic or the foreign country, whereas the domestic
(foreign) multinational rm (MNE) has located its a¢ liate in the foreign (do-
mestic) country. The overall number of rms per country is normalized to unity,
 of them are MNEs, 1   are PNEs.
From the beginning, we make strong assumptions on symmetry, for purpose of
simplicity. Here, that means that we assume that the number of rms and their
distribution between MNEs and PNEs is equal in both countries.
The representative investor has an after-tax income of
 =  (Fm + F

m) + (1  ) (Fn + F n) (6.4)
 r (1 + )    KHm +KAm+ (1  )  KHn +KAn 
 r (1 +  )    KAm +KHm + (1  )  KHn +KAn 
The capital demand can be derived using the rst order conditions in (6.2) and
(6.3) where H and A are either in the domestic or the foreign location, and H
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and A are either the domestic tax rate  or the foreign tax rate  , depending
on the type of rm under consideration. The capital stocks of the domestic MNE
(subscript m) are a¤ected by tax rate changes as follows:
dKHm
d
= 
 1FAAr and
dKHm
d 
= 
 1FHAr (6.5)
dKAm
d 
= 
 1FHHr and
dKAm
d
= 
 1FAHr (6.6)
and the domestic PNE (subscript n):
dKHn
d
= 
 1
 
FAA   FHA r and dKHn
d 
= 0 (6.7)
dKAn
d 
= 0 and
dKA
d
= 
 1
 
FHH   FAH r (6.8)
Equivalent expressions can be deducted for the foreign MNE and the foreign
PNE. Actually, this is the core feature of our model, that purely national rms
(PNE) and multinational rms (MNE) react di¤erently to uncoordinated tax rate
changes although their production technology and structure may be perfectly
identical. When PNEs and MNEs coexist, then taxes may distort the produc-
tion structure of the economy, i.e. the relative sizes of the PNE sector and the
MNE sector.
6.2.3 Capital market equilibrium
Capital market equilibrium requires that the sum of capital stocks equals the
capital supply S which is exogenously given and constant.
S = 
 
KHm +K
A
m +K
H
m +K
A
m

+ (1  )  KHn +KAn +KHn +KAn  (6.9)
First consider a unilateral increase in the domestic corporate tax rate. The
appendix shows that total di¤erentiation of (6.9) yields the interest rate response
to an increase in  :
dr
d
=  
 
FAAm + F
HH
m   FHAm   FAHm


 1
2 (FHH + FAA   FHA   FAH) 
 1
r
1 + 
=  0; 5 r
1 + 
(6.10)
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A coordinated tax increase, i.e. d = d , starting from  =   = + yields
dr
d
=   r
1+
, where + denotes the coordinated common tax rate. This can be
illustrated as follows. Since the world capital stock is xed and capital stocks have
their optimal size when tax rates are equal, a coordinated increase does not change
the size of the capital stocks. This can only be the case if the cost of capital c
stays constant: dc = @c
@+
d++ @c
@r
dr = 0. With @c
@+
= r and @c
@r
= 1+ +, it follows
dr
d
=   r
1++
.
6.2.4 Equilibrium tax e¤ects
Taking equilibrium e¤ects on the interest rate into account, the e¤ect of a small
increase in the domestic tax rate on the multinationals stock of capital is given
by dK
H
m
d
= @K
H
m
@
+ @K
H
m
@r
dr
d
or
dKHm
d
= 0; 5r
 1
 
FAA + FHA

(6.11)
whereas the equilibrium tax e¤ect on the PNEs headquarter is given by
dKHn
d
= 0; 5r
 1
 
FAA   FHA (6.12)
If there are no complementarities or substitutabilities in the production struc-
ture, then both e¤ects are equal. If, however, headquarter and a¢ liate production
is complementary (substitutable), the equilibrium e¤ects on multinationals are
weaker (stronger) than on purely national rms. Note again, that in terms of
production technology both types of rms are perfectly identical.
Now, consider the e¤ect of an increase in the domestic tax rate on the foreign
a¢ liate of the domestic multinational rm and the foreign a¢ liate of the foreign
purely national rm.
dKAm
d
=  0; 5r
 1  FHH + FAH (6.13)
dKAn
d
=  0; 5r
 1  FHH   FAH (6.14)
Again, with complementarity (substitutability) in production technologies, the
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e¤ect on the multinationals capital stock is weaker than the e¤ect on the purely
national rms stock of capital.
We summarize this in
Proposition 10 Sectoral distortion:When the production technology in headquar-
ters and a¢ liates is complementary, an increase in the domestic tax rate changes
the relative sector sizes in both countries. Under perfect symmetry assumptions,
increasing domestic tax rates
- reduces the domestic PNEs capital stock more than the domestic MNEs.
- increases the foreign PNEs capital stock more than the foreign MNEs.
The opposite is true if production technology is characterized by substitutability.
The above proposition deserves some interpretation. As discussed in the intro-
ductory subchapter, the empirical literature suggests complementary production
technologies. If this is true, then in high-tax countries the multinational sector is
too large whereas the purely national sector is too small. Equivalently, in low-tax
countries, the multinational sector is too small. This runs counter to the intuition
as it appears in the public debate. Many of the tax rate cuts observed in the past
years were motivated by the hope that multinational rms would react by increas-
ing their investment. This may be true but, if our model captures some features of
reality, stronger e¤ects can be expected in the PNE sector. Note, though, that this
expectation is based on the assumption that there are no systematical di¤erences
between national and multinational rms. However, if they are systematically dif-
ferent, tax e¤ects that di¤er from those in the model are due to these di¤erences
in technology, protability etc. and not to the status of being national or multina-
tional (although these two dimensions of characteristics may be related by causal
linkages).
Another implication is that domestic tax policy has an externality on the capital
stock of the foreign country. In addition to the well-known scal externality on
the foreign countrys tax revenue, domestic tax policy has an external e¤ect on the
foreign production structure, i.e. the size of the PNE sector relative to the MNE
sector. Whether this externality changes the standard tax competition results will
be analyzed in the following subchapter.
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6.2.5 Optimal tax policy and tax coordination
Welfare is assumed to depend on private consumption C and a publicly provided
good G. The welfare function is given by W = U (C) +H (G). Public goods are
nanced by corporate tax revenue:
G = r
 
KHm +K
A
m

+ (1  ) r  KHn +KAn  (6.15)
The domestic households private consumption is equal to C =  + 0; 5rS,
where  is the fraction that the household owns of the representative investors
shares. Using the fact that half of the capital stock is owned by the household as
well as (6.9) and (6.4), C can be expressed as
C = 
 
Fm + F

m   r
 
KHm +K
A
m
   r  KAm +KHm  (6.16)
+ (1  )  Fn + F n   r  KHn +KAn    r  KHn +KAn 
The e¤ect of a small increase in the domestic tax rate  on welfare at a given
interest rate r is equal to @W
@
= U 0 @C
@
+H 0 @G
@
or
@W
@
= 

(H 0   U 0)  KHm +KAm r +H 0r@KHm@ + @KAm@

(6.17)
+(1  )

(H 0   U 0)  KHn +KAn  r +H 0r@KHn@ + @KAn@

At  =  , the capital stocks in the MNEs and the PNEs headquarters and
a¢ liates are of equal size,KH andKA. Using that @K
H
m
@
+ @K
H
m
@ =
@KHn
@
, @K
A
m
@
+ @K
A
m
@ =
@KAn
@
, if evaluated at  =  , the above equation boils down to
@W
@
= (H 0   U 0)  KH +KA r +H 0r@KHn
@
+
@KAn
@

 H 0r

@KHm
@ 
+
@KAm
@ 

(6.18)
The rst term in square brackets on the r.h.s. is the welfare gain due to
increased tax revenue. The second term is the negative impact due to the reduction
of the domestic capital stock in response to increased capital taxation. The third
110 CHAPTER 6. MULTINATIONALS AND TAX COMPETITION
term is negative, if FHH < FAH and depends on the fraction of PNE in the
economy. In other words, the higher the fraction of multinational rms in the
economy the higher is the welfare gain from increasing taxes, and the lower is the
elasticity of the domestic capital stock. Optimal tax policy implies @W
@
= 0.7 The
optimal tax rate  is given by
 =  

1   U
0
H 0
  
KH +KA

r
@KHn
@
+ @K
A
n
@
  

@KHm
@ +
@KAm
@
 (6.19)
The optimal tax rate increases in the degree of foreign rm ownership (1  ),
the di¤erence between H 0 and U 0 and the size of the tax base,
 
KH +KA

r. The
optimal tax rate is lower, the more elastically capital stocks react to tax changes,
see the denominator. Moreover, if headquarter and a¢ liate capital stocks are
complementary, i.e. @K
H
m
@ ;
@KAm
@ < 0, the tax rate increases in the fraction  of
multinational rms.
We may summarize these results in
Proposition 11 The higher the fraction of multinational rms in the economy,
the higher (lower) is the optimal tax rate  if headquarter and a¢ liate production
are complements (substitutes).
The welfare change with respect to   is given by @W
@ = U
0 @C
@ +H
0 @G
@ or
@W
@ 
=  U 0r  KA +KH+ H 0r@KHm
@ 
+
@KAm
@ 

(6.20)
where we used the equality in capital stock sizes, wich is given for  =  .
The rst term on the r.h.s. is the well-known e¤ect which is due to foreign rm
ownership. The second term is new and results from the interdependence of capital
stocks across borders within a multinational rm. The foreign tax c.p. decreases
the capital stock in the domestic country, if capital stocks are complementary,
@KHm
@ ;
@KAm
@ < 0, and thus reduces the tax base. In contrast, if capital stocks are
substitutes, then there is a positive externality due to production interdependency:
7Note that, due to foreign rm ownership ( < 1), it is not clear whether there is underpro-
vision of public goods, whether H 0 > U 0.
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@KHm
@ ;
@KAm
@ > 0. Note that the second term is equal to zero if the fraction of
multinational rms in the economy is zero or the capital stocks are independently
determined.
The question arises whether this newexternality may change the standard
tax competition result of underprovision of public goods, and precisely, whether
tax coordination is still welfare-enhancing in the presence of capital stock com-
plementarities. In the following, we consider a coordinated increase in tax rates
 and  , starting from a symmetric situation in which both countries are per-
fectly indentical and both tax rates are equal  =  . Furthermore, the increase
satises d = d . The e¤ect on welfare is dW = @W
@
d + @W
@d
 + @W
@r
dr, i.e.
dW
d+
= @W
@
+ @W
@ +
@W
@r
dr
d+
.
With the domestic tax rate  optimally set, @W
@
= 0, the appendix shows that
the e¤ect of a coordinated increase can be expressed as
dW
d+
=  U 0 r
1 + 
 
KH +KA
  (H 0   U 0) 
1 + 
r
 
KH +KA

 H 0r

@KH
@r
+
@KA
@r

r
1 + 
+ H 0r

@KHm
@ 
+
@KAm
@ 

(6.21)
The rst two terms have a negative sign reecting the averse welfare e¤ects of
higher taxes on consumption (due to foreign rm ownership) and lower interest
rates. The third term is positive and captures the capital stock increases in re-
sponse to lower interest rates. The last term is negative and depends on the
fraction of MNEs in the economy. The larger the share of MNEs the lower is
the welfare gain from coordination. This mirrors the lower e¢ ciency loss due to
the existence of MNEs in setting the domestic tax rate  optimally, see equation
(6.20).
The appendix shows that the coordination e¤ect on welfare can be rearranged
to
dW
d+
=  U 0  KA +KH r
1 + 
+ (H 0   U 0)  KH +KA r
1 + 
(6.22)
which is strictly positive if  < 1
2
H0
U 0 . The assumption of perfect symmetry
implies that  = 0; 5. It follows that tax coordination has an unambiguously
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positive impact on welfare as long as there is underprovision of public goods. This
result does not depend on the fraction  of multinational rms.
We can therefore state
Proposition 12 Although there is a negative scal externality of corporate tax-
ation due to the interdependence of capital stocks, a coordinated increase of 
unambiguously increases welfare (if one abstracts from the countervailing e¤ect of
foreign rm ownership). That means that the negative externality is dominated by
the positive externality.
6.3 Extensions
In this subchapter, we consider an alternative way of modelling the corporate tax
system and ask for the optimal system of repatriation taxes in the presence of
complementarities.
6.3.1 Prot taxes instead of capital taxes
The corporate tax has two features. It is levied upon the pure prots part of the
rms income and it increases the cost of capital. In the model above, we only
consider the latter feature of the corporate tax. This is useful for two reasons.
Firstly, it simplies the analysis in notational terms. Secondly, we do not have to
deal explicitly with the allocation of prots across production locations. Implicitly,
we assume that prots are apportioned to the locations according to the capital
stock size.
In the model, the after-tax income of the rm is given by
 = F
 
KH ; KA
  r (1 + )KH   r (1 +  )KA (6.23)
In contrast, the standard corporate tax rate is levied upon output minus de-
ductible cost (the latter being normalized to zero) minus a depreciation allowance
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for capital expenditures. In a simple manner, this could be expressed as
 = (1 m m (1  ))F  KH ; KA
 r (1  m)KH   (1  m) rKA (6.24)
where m (m) is the domestic (foreign) statutory tax rate and  is the fraction
of output allocated to the headquarter for tax reasons. Parameters  and 
denote the allowance for corporate capital in the domestic and the foreign location,
respectively.
Optimal capital input at the domestic headquarter is given by
FH = r

1  m
1 m

+

m  m
1 m

@
@KH
F
 
KH ; KA
  (1  )FH (6.25)
If the depreciation parameter  is set equal to 1 and if we assume a symmetric
situation, then taxes do not distort investment: FH = r. Our model therefore can
be interpreted as analysis of a tax system which, for some reason8, deviates from
full depreciation:
FH = r

1  m
1 m

 r (1 + ) (6.26)
with  = m
1 m (1  ). In the context of our model, it is helpful to assume
a situation with m = m where governments decide on the optimal level of 
(thereby determining ).
6.3.2 Repatriation taxation
Now, consider the question how optimal repatriation taxation looks like in a model
with production complementarities within a multinational rm. Assume that there
is only one MNE owned by the domestic household. The optimal capital input is
given by
FH = (1 + ) r and F A = (1 +   + T ) r (6.27)
where T is the repatriation tax levied by the domestic government.
8These reasons are analyzed and discussed in e.g. Hauer and Schjelderup (2000) and Becker
and Fuest (2007a).
114 CHAPTER 6. MULTINATIONALS AND TAX COMPETITION
National income is given by
Y = F
 
KH ; K  KH  rKH   (1 +  ) r  K  KH (6.28)
Nationally optimal repatriation taxation implies
dY
dT
=
 
FH   r    F A   (1 +  ) r dKH
dT
= 0 (6.29)
The term in brackets is zero if T =  , which is equivalent to the full taxation
after deduction system. This can be explained as follows. Gross interest is given
by r+r . T is levied upon the net interest rate, i.e. after deducting foreign taxes.
This result does not depend on the degree of complementarity.
6.4 Discussion and concluding remarks
Recent evidence, including the estimations reported in the preceding chapter, sug-
gests that foreign and domestic activities are linked through complementarities in
production and capital stocks. In this chapter, we analyzed tax competition in the
presence of complementarities (or substitutabilities). Therefore, we built a model
in which all rms are identical; the only di¤erence is that some domestic (foreign)
rms have located their a¢ liates in the foreign (domestic) country. Those rms
are called multinational rms.
It turns out, that counter to the intuition increasing tax rates increase the
relative size of the multinational sector if headquarter and a¢ liates are linked
through complementarities. The reason is that multinational rms are able to
exportpart of the deterring tax e¤ects. The implication is that corporate tax
rates c.p. have a negative externality on the foreign countrys capital stocks and,
thus, tax bases. In a closed model, i.e. with endogenous interest rates, this negative
externality is always dominated by the positive externality taking the form of lower
interest rates and increased investment in the foreign country.
The main implication of our model results is that the existence of multina-
tional rms dampens the pressure from tax competition rather than fueling it.
The standard view is to think about MNEs as accelerators of globalization and tax
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competition. This ignores that capital can be shifted abroad through the capital
market channel instead of within the MNE. If there are no production comple-
mentarities, these two channels are equivalent. If, however, domestic and foreign
capital stocks are linked through complementarities, as suggested by the above
mentioned literature, the use of the MNE channel mitigates the pressure from tax
competition since it leads to a kind of tax burden sharing between countries.
Appendix
App. 1
This appendix derives (6.10)
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d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Under symmetry the numerator is given by

 1
 
FAAm + F
HH
m   FHAm   FAHm

r
Under symmetry, the denominator is given by
2 (1 + )
 
FHH + FAA   FHA   FAH
 1
Denominator and numerator form equation (6.10) in the text.
App. 2
Now, equations (6.21) and (6.22) are formally derived. With dr
d
=   r
1  , what
is the e¤ect of a change in the interest rate on welfare? The welfare e¤ect is
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The welfare e¤ects of taxes are given by
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As derived in the text, the e¤ect of a coordinated tax increase on the interest
rate is given by dr
d+
=   r
1+
. With  optimally chosen, i.e. @W
@
= 0, the welfare
e¤ect is dW
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+
= @W
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 +
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d+
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In the following, we use KHm = K
H
n = K
H etc.
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 = 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which is equation (6.21) in the text.
Alternatively, the welfare e¤ect can be derived alternatively by using the entire
expression of dW
d+
= @W
@
+ @W
@ +
@W
@r
dr
d+
:
dW
d+
=  U 0  KA +KH r
1 + 
+ (H 0   U 0)  KH +KA r
1 + 
which is equation (6.22) in the text.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In the previous chapters, di¤erent sources of rm heterogeneity were considered
and introduced into standard models of tax analysis. It was shown that assum-
ing di¤erences among rms with respect to various aspects challenges several of
the standard results in tax economics and often changes them substantially. In
chapter 2, the introduction of heterogeneity in mobility and protability changed
the standard results that the marginal unit of invested capital should not be taxed.
Chapter 3 showed that the existence of feedback e¤ects of foreign investment on
domestic prots looses the relationship between taxes and the quantity of invest-
ment and, under certain circumstances, can even turn it around. In chapter 4,
we showed that heterogeneity in the access to tax havens may imply that tax
competition leads to ine¢ ciently high levels of tax enforcement. In chapter 5,
heterogeneity in ownership determines how a¢ liates are exposed to tax changes
in other countries than their own. In chapter 6, nally, the di¤erences between
national and multinational rms a¤ect the degree of tax competition.
To sum up, what can be learnt is that observable sources of heterogeneity may
change the outcomes of tax competition in a non-negligible way. The range of
heterogeneity sources is too broad to imagine a unifying framework. Therefore,
one should interpret the studies presented in the previous chapters as exemplary
cases in which heterogeneity turned out to be important and changed some results
of the standard tax literature. In addition, since an innity of heterogeneity sources
can be imagined, it remains an empirical question and research task to identify
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those aspects of heterogeneity which are important from a public nance point of
view.
The policy implications of the previous chapters can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, in the presence of heterogeneous rms, the policy recommendations of
standard tax theory, i.e. zero taxation of the marginal investment project, may be
misleading and certainly need revision, see chapter 2. Secondly, the focus on the
quantity of investment, both in the public debate and in the empirical scholarly
work, may miss important qualitative aspects of cross-border investment ows. In
other words, if a country receives large amounts of inbound FDI, this does not need
to mean that its tax or economic policy is successful. A closer look to who invests
and which projects are realized is necessary, see chapters 3 and 4. Finally, we may
have to reconsider the role of multinational rms in the process of globalization.
The often cited view that multinational rms should be blamed for aggravating
the pressure from tax competition and for forcing governments to reduce corporate
tax rates, is not (or less) justied if complementarities within the multinational
are accounted for. In contrast, a world in which integration is mainly achieved
by border crossing rm structures may be less vulnerable to interjurisdictional
competition than a world in which capital is shifted via banks and other nancial
intermediaires, see chapters 5 and 6.
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